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The Powers of the Head of State in the Legislative and 
Executive Branch in Former Socialist Systems 
 




Abstract This paper deals with the position and the powers of head of 
state in the legislative and the executive branch in former socialist 
systems. It examines the system in countries that emerged from socialist 
regimes, where the parliamentary system and the function of the President 
of the Republic as the individual head of state were introduced in the 
1990s, namely in 10 (newest) Member States of the European Union. The 
paper elaborates on the position of the President of the Republic, the 
extent of the office’s powers, and the resulting cooperation between the 
office of the President,  the executive and legislative bodies, which is also 
one of the fundamental criteria of the standard classification of political 
regimes. The powers of the President in the field of legislation are the 
powers based on which the relationship between the President of the 
Republic and the legislative authority is established. The analyzed powers 
that the President exercises vis-à-vis the parliament are the powers of the 
President in relation to the adoption of an Act, the powers that the 
President of the Republic has in the domain of announcing parliamentary 
elections and convening a parliamentary sitting, as well as the powers in 
the domain of dissolving the parliament and announcing early elections. 
In the second part the paper focuses on the relationship between the 
President of the Republic and the government, and, consequently, the 
President's powers in the formation of the government and the appointing 
of state officials.  
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This paper discusses the position and the powers of the head of state in the legislative 
and the executive branch in former socialist systems.
1
 It presents in more detail the 
powers of the President in Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, i.e. in ten (newest) European Union member states. 
These countries are member states of the European Union that emerged from socialist 
regimes and introduced the parliamentary system in the 1990s. In general the President 
as the head of state has very limited powers in a parliamentary system, and primarily 
plays a representative role. The main characteristics of the parliamentary system and an 
appropriate balance between key state bodies based on the principle of the separation of 
powers were the baseline for assessing the position of the President in the legislative 
and the executive branch in the examined systems.  
 
The paper first analyzes the position of the President and the associated classifications 
of political systems. Especially in the past, tendencies towards a semi-presidential 
system could be observed in the EU’s new democracies. The majority of countries did 
not select this system, but instead limited the president’s powers and introduced the 
parliamentary system, granting their Presidents various extents of powers. In certain 
systems, individual elements of a parliamentary-presidential system can be observed.  
 
The analyzed powers that the President exercises vis-à-vis the parliament are the powers 
of the President in the legislative procedure, the powers that the President of the 
Republic has in regard to calling the parliamentary election and convening a 
parliamentary sitting, as well as the power to dissolve the parliament.
2
 In certain 
countries the President holds the right of legislative initiative in the legislative 
procedure. In all the examined systems the President of the Republic signs and 
promulgates the laws, and usually holds the right of veto, which postpones the 
promulgation and consequently the implementation of the law. In the majority of 
examined systems the President of the Republic holds the right of legislative as well as 
constitutional veto, meaning they must decide whether to return the adopted law back to 
the parliament for reconsideration or send it to the Constitutional Court for a 
constitutional review. In systems where the President does not hold the right of 
constitutional veto they have the right to request a constitutional review of the law after 
its promulgation and its coming into force. Slovenia is an exception in this case. 
 
The separately examined power of the President to call a parliamentary election may be 
actually interpreted as a duty. Although this power may seem as a mere formality at 
first, it is a right that can even affect the election results and the composition of the 
parliament. In all the examined countries (with the exception of Latvia) the President of 
the Republic has the right to convene (the first) sitting of the parliament. This right 
originates from history and the monarchical system, and gives the President of the 
Republic direct influence on the work of this legislative body.  
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This paper also discusses in more detail the President’s power to dissolve the parliament 
and call an early election. This right is usually exercised when the parliament is unable 
to form a government or when the government loses its support in the parliament. This 
paper analyses and categorizes situations when the dissolution of parliament is 
permissible, while taking into account potential time limitations and whether the 
President of the Republic may dissolve the parliament at their own discretion or whether 
they must consider the will of other bodies, or are even obliged to dissolve parliament 
immediately when the conditions for dissolution are met.  
 
In addition to differences in the extent of powers held by the President in different 
systems there are also differences in the level of independence in exercising these 
powers. In certain systems the President of the Republic may act completely at their 
own discretion, while in other systems they must collaborate with other bodies, in 
particular with the government or the parliament. To provide a more realistic and 
complete picture of the position of the President of the Republic in a certain system, we 
must of course also consider the possibilities of informally interfering with or 
influencing the work of legislative bodies in addition to formally defined powers. The 
extent of the President’s powers is defined by the constitution; however the 
constitutional provisions are merely the basis of the actual role and influence of the 
President in daily politics. In addition to powers stipulated by the Constitution, other 
factors, such as political support, and the personality and authoritativeness of the 




This analysis of the President’s legislative powers is followed by a presentation of the 
President’s executive powers, i.e. the powers, based on which a relationship is 
established between the President, the government and other executive branch bodies, 
and the parliament. The most important among these powers are definitely the powers 
of the President in forming the government. The President’s constitutional powers in 
appointing the highest state officials are then presented in a subsection. This is followed 
by an outline of the institute of countersignature, which establishes an additional bond 
between the President and the government. 
 
Based on the analysis of the President’s position in the legislative and the executive 
branch, i.e. their legislative and executive powers in the new European Union 
democracies, the paper will present similarities between individual systems, as well as 
highlight their differences and specifics, and categorize individual solutions. The 
findings will allows us to critically assess the position of the President in the examined 
systems, with emphasis on the (un)suitability of the Slovenian system.  
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2 General about the position of the president 
 
The position of Presidents, especially the extent of their powers and the resulting 
relationships between them and the legislative and executive bodies, is one of the 
fundamental criteria of the standard classification of political systems.
4
 In theory, there 
is a range of criteria used for assessing the role or position of the President. The 
differences are above all reflected in the selection of individual powers and their further 
valuation.
5
 Considering the President’s legislative and executive powers, and the extent 
of their independence in exercising these powers, the majority of examined systems can 





In general, the executive powers in parliamentary systems are divided between the 
President, who is the head of the executive branch only symbolically, and the 
government, which holds the actual executive power. In modern parliamentary systems, 
the President actually operates outside the classic three branches of government, and 
primarily acts as a neutral authority.
7
 The same position was also taken by the 
Constitutional Court of Hungary.
8
 The situation is different in the presidential system, 
where the President also actually leads the executive branch of government.
9
 In this 
system, there is no government as a separate collective body responsible to the 
parliament. In addition to the parliamentary and presidential systems, we should also 
highlight the semi-presidential system.
10
 In a semi-presidential system, a directly elected 
President holds more limited powers than in a presidential system, as the office works in 
tandem with the government, while compared to the parliamentary system, the President 
in this system has stronger influence, especially on government policy.
11
 Considering 
the various elements of the semi-presidential system, we can further distinguish between 
presidential-parliamentary and parliamentary-presidential systems. In the parliamentary-
presidential system, as opposed to the presidential-parliamentary, the President does not 
have the power to dismiss the Prime Minister or the government as a whole without the 




The Polish system in place before the country’s constitution was amended in 1997 could 
be classified as parliamentary-presidential, however the initially strong power of the 
head of state was gradually restricted, and the President has mostly kept only those 
powers held by the President in the parliamentary system, along with the right to a veto 
on adopted laws, which is very hard to overcome, and is uncharacteristic for a 
parliamentary system.
13
 Lithuania’s government system could be prima facie also 
classified as parliamentary-presidential based on the fact that the president is elected 
directly, and based on the powers held by the President, especially in foreign policy.
14
 
Compared to the Polish system, the characteristics on the basis of which the Lithuanian 
system is classified as semi-presidential are even less pronounced.
15
 Some have 
classified the Bulgarian and Romanian systems as parliamentary-presidential, however 
this classification is primarily based on the President’s de facto activities, and not so 
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much on the powers granted to them by the legislation.
16
 Considering the President’s 
formal powers, the Bulgarian system is more similar to the German than the French 
model. The Romanian President has a strong staff of almost three hundred people, 
which can in certain circumstances pose a dangerous counterbalance to the 
government.
17
 It should also be pointed out that the amendments to the Romanian 
constitution in 2003 brought a clearer demarcation of the President’s powers, 
determining among other things that the President cannot dismiss the Prime Minister. 
Other countries (Latvia, Estonia and Hungary) can be classified as countries with a 
traditional parliamentary system and an indirectly elected President. Slovakia, Slovenia, 
and the Czech Republic are not in this group only because the President in those 
countries is elected directly.
18
 It should be noted that Slovakia introduced direct 
elections due to a crisis where the parliament failed to elect the President despite several 
attempts, while Slovenia due to cultural, historical and political reasons. Political 
reasons also led to changing the voting system at the presidential election in the Czech 
Republic. Gradually all the countries with elements of a parliamentary-presidential 
system limited the President’s powers, and introduced the parliamentary system, 
granting the President a different extent of powers.
19
 The studied countries can be thus 
divided in three groups: countries with a strong President (Lithuania, Poland), countries 
with a President with moderate power (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, 




3 Legislative Powers 
 
3.1 The Right of Legislative Initiative and Promulgation of the Law 
 
The legislative powers of the President discussed in this chapter may be divided into 
those exercised by the President of the Republic before the legislative procedure starts 
(such as the right of legislative initiative) and those exercised after the legislative 
procedure (such as the right to promulgate the law or the right of legislative or 
constitutional veto). During the legislative procedure, which is completely under 
parliament’s authority, the President of the Republic has no direct or formal influence 
on the content of the law in the examined systems. Taking into account how often 
Presidents exercise their right of legislative initiative, the most effective means of 
influencing the content of the law available to the President is the right of veto. This is 
for instance demonstrated by the example of Latvia, where the President of the Republic 
holds both rights, but usually influences the legislative procedure by exercising the right 
of suspensive veto and not the right of legislative initiative.
21
 We should emphasize up 
front that the Presidents of the examined countries had often and effectively exercised 
their right of suspensive veto in the past; however the use of the right of veto has 
gradually subsided, primarily due to the stabilization of the political space.  
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3.1.1 The Right of Legislative Initiative 
 
The right of legislative initiative gives the President of the Republic the possibility to 
influence the work of the legislators. The right of legislative initiative granted to the 
President may be formal or informal. Generally such formal power of the President of 
the Republic is characteristic of systems where the President has more power, i.e. 
presidential and semi-presidential systems.
22
 In the majority of parliamentary systems 
the President of the Republic does not have the (formal) right of legislative initiative, 
but can however exercise their influence indirectly, for example by expressing their 
opinions. Even though Poland, Hungary, Lithuania and Latvia have a developed 
parliamentary system, their President also holds the right of legislative initiative.
23
 The 
Estonian, Bulgarian and Romanian constitutions restrict this power, and only grant the 
President the right to submit a motion for amending the constitution.
24
 The Romanian 
President is even further restricted, as they are bound by the government’s opinion.
 
The 
Polish and Hungarian Presidents hold the broadest power in regard to this, and hold the 





In these systems the President shares the right of legislative initiative with other bodies. 
Laws may also be proposed by members of the parliament (and senators in Poland), the 
government, and (except in Hungary) by a certain number of voters.
26
 The Latvian 
system, in which the President is the only body with the right of legislative initiative 
who does not have to submit a fully drawn up, legally edited draft bill, stands out.
27
 This 
(at least on paper) makes it easier for the President to exercise this power. 
 
In order to correctly define this power, we should point out that compared to other 
bodies with the right of legislative initiative the Presidents rarely exercise this power 
(the President of Latvia has for example only submitted one draft bill per year on 
average).
28
 After the new Constitution came into force in 1992 and until 2006, the 
President of Estonia only submitted one amendment to the Constitution in 2001, 
proposing that direct presidential elections be introduced and that an independent 
Constitutional Court be established.
29
 The President of Lithuania submitted the highest 
number of draft bills among those examined, although he still submitted the smallest 
share (merely four percent) of legislative proposals compared to other bodies with the 




The President’s actual influence on the content of the law and its adoption largely 
depends on the political composition of the parliament, as the fate of the law is 
determined by members of the parliament at the end. The President’s influence in 
systems with cohabitation is accordingly smaller than in systems where the President 
comes from the same political grouping as the majority in the parliament. Considering 
that the President of the Republic often exercises restraint in regard to day-to-day 
politics and holds a neutral (non-partisan) position towards the ruling coalition or 
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opposition, the President’s right of legislative initiative in a parliamentary system may 
also be deemed as an anachronism. 
 
3.1.2 Promulgation of a Law 
 
Promulgation of a law (Lat. promulgare) is a traditional function of a President of a 
Republic. This power does not entail the President’s participation in the legislative 
procedure in the narrowest sense, which ends with the adoption of the law, but is the 





In all the examined systems the duty of promulgation is assigned to the President of the 
Republic; however some constitutions also stipulate that the laws must be co-signed. In 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic laws are for example co-signed by the President, the 
Prime Minister, and the Speaker of the parliament or Chairman of the Chamber of 
Deputies in case of the Czech Republic.
32
 Considering the President’s right and duty of 
promulgation, the question arises what to do when the President refuses to promulgate a 
law. Not many Constitutions regulate such cases explicitly. The Lithuanian Constitution 
contains provisions for such cases for example.
33
 If the President of Lithuania does not 
sign the law in the prescribed period or exercise the right of suspensive veto, the law 
may be signed and promulgated by the speaker of parliament. The Slovak Constitution 
only contains a provision stating that a law which was returned to the parliament and 
adopted again must be promulgated, even if it is not signed by the President.
34
 
Promulgation of a law without the President’s signature is similarly regulated in the 
Czech Republic, where the President does not sign a readopted law that they initially 
objected.
35
 In other systems the provisions on the temporary replacement of the function 
of President of the Republic should be applied in such cases. 
 
The promulgation of a law is not a mere automatic action, since the President of the 
Republic (except in Slovenia) holds the right of suspensive veto, if they believe that 
there are reasons and arguments for returning the law to the parliament for 
reconsideration or for requesting a constitutional review. We should emphasize here that 
the President of the Republic usually must promulgate a law after it is adopted again or 
upheld by the Constitutional Court.  
 
We should also point out that Presidents of the examined countries often exercised their 
right of suspensive veto in the past. The President of the Czech Republic exercised his 
right of suspensive veto 18 times between 1993 and 2001, and in almost one third of the 
cases the law then went unadopted, as it did not receive the required absolute majority 
in the parliament.
36
 The situation was similar in Estonia, where in two parliamentary 
terms between 1992 and 1999 the President returned 33 laws to the parliament, and also 
requested their constitutional review in eight cases, with the Supreme Court ruling that 
seven laws were unconstitutional; while in the following two terms between 1999 and 
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2007 the President refused to promulgate only 18 laws and requested a constitutional 
review in only four cases, with the Supreme Court declaring two laws as 
unconstitutional.
37
 The decrease in the number of vetoed laws may be attributed to 
greater political stability in these countries. Nowadays the use of suspensive veto is 
mostly affected by the potential existence of cohabitation, i.e. when the President of the 
Republic comes from a different political grouping than the majority in the parliament 




3.1.2.1 Legislative Veto 
 
If the President of the Republic disagrees with the content of a law or individual 
provisions, they may return the law to the parliament for reconsideration in a specified 
period of time. Such a veto postpones the promulgation of the law and consequently the 
date it comes into force. We should point out that in all analyzed countries (except in 
Slovenia) the President of the Republic holds the right of legislative veto, however in 
some systems the President has lost the right of veto against certain laws. The Czech 
Constitution explicitly states that the President does not hold the right of veto against 
constitutional acts and must promulgate them, in Poland the President does not have the 
right of veto in the adoption of the budget, and in Latvia when the law is adopted as 




In the event of a legislative veto the share of votes required for the law to be readopted 
by the parliament is as a rule higher. The weight of the President’s veto depends on the 
share of votes required for the adoption of the law in the repeated vote. In the examined 
systems, the President’s veto carries the least weight in those systems where readopting 
the law requires simple majority, which is the case only in Romania, Hungary, Estonia, 
and Latvia. A higher share of votes is required in most countries – an absolute majority 
in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Lithuania, while in Poland at least a three-
fifths majority is required with at least one half of the members of the parliament 
present. In none of the systems does the President hold the right of (a second) legislative 
veto after a law is readopted by parliament.  
 
The influence that the President has on the content of a law when exercising the right of 
veto also depends on whether a vetoed law may be amended or not before the repeated 
vote. In some systems (for example in Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, and Bulgaria) a 
law returned to parliament for reconsideration may not be changed and the parliament 
must either adopt it again unchanged or reject it.
40 
In other countries the law may be 
amended or modified in accordance with the President’s comments before the repeated 
vote. In Hungary the President’s further right to apply legislative veto depends on 
whether the members of the parliament have considered the President’s comments and 
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The Lithuanian system stands out, as the President of Lithuania also occasionally used a 
pocket veto until a Constitutional Court’s ruling. This means that the President did not 
sign the law within the prescribed 10-day deadline nor did they provide reasons for the 
rejection. Such law could then come into force with the signature of the Speaker of the 
parliament.
41
 The President’s situation when applying pocket veto is significantly easier 
than when formally exercising the right of suspensive veto, since the President does not 
have to refuse to sign a law nor provide comments on its content. Pocket veto originates 
in the USA constitutional system, where such veto has the effect of an absolute veto, as 
the legislative procedure concludes with the end of the Congress’s sitting. In Lithuania 
the pocket veto is practically impossible nowadays, as the Constitutional Court 
emphasized that the President must always provide reasons and legal arguments for 
refusing the promulgation. The Constitutional Court also stated that the constitutional 
provision giving the Speaker of the parliament the power to sign and promulgate a law 
if the President does not sign it (or return it to the parliament) in the prescribed period of 




The Latvian system should also be pointed out when discussing the President’s powers 
in promulgating a law.
43
 When a law is adopted, the President of the Republic may 
request that it be reconsidered. If the parliament readopts said law without any changes, 
the President may not again return the law to the parliament for reconsideration, but 
they may postpone the promulgation of the law for two months. The President first 
exercised this right in 2007.
44
 The President must postpone the promulgation of a law if 
so requested by one third of the members of the parliament. A referendum is held on 
such a suspended law if at least one tenth of all voters demand that. This may be 
referred to as an “absolute citizens’ veto”. A law is rejected in this case if the majority 
votes against it, under the condition that the turnout at the referendum equals at least 
one half of the turnout at the latest parliamentary election.
45
 If voters do not file for a 
referendum within two months, the law is promulgated. A referendum is also not called 
if three quarters of all members of the parliament endorse it in the repeated vote. It 
should also be pointed out that if the parliament determines that a law is urgent with a 
two-thirds majority, the President of the Republic does not have the right to veto such a 





3.1.2.2 Constitutional Veto 
 
If the Presidents hold the right of the so called constitutional veto, they may seek the 
constitutional court’s ruling on whether a law is constitutional before promulgating it, if 
they believe that the law or its individual provisions are unconstitutional. Almost one 
half of the examined systems grant this right to the President. Presidents of Romania, 
Poland, Hungary, and Estonia may call on the constitutional court to rule on the 
constitutionality of a law before promulgating it.
47
 In the systems where the President 
holds the right of legislative as well as constitutional veto, they must usually decide 
10 THE POWERS OF THE HEAD OF STATE IN THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
IN FORMER SOCIALIST SYSTEMS 
T. Dubrovnik, A. Kobal 
 
which veto to apply. This is the case in Romania and Poland, and partially Hungary, 
where only the Constitutional Court’s ruling is deemed final.
48 
In Estonia the President 
may apply both vetoes; however they must exercise the right of legislative veto before 
the right of constitutional veto. 
 
The Polish Constitution states that the decision of the members of the parliament or the 
Constitutional Court’s ruling is final and must be followed by the promulgation of the 
law. In regard to the Polish President’s right of constitutional veto we should also point 
out that when the Constitutional Court rules that only individual provisions are 
unconstitutional and these provisions are not an indivisible part of the entire law, the 
President may (after consultation with the Speaker of the Sejm) sign and promulgate the 
law omitting the unconstitutional provisions, or return it to the Sejm so the deputies may 
eliminate the unconstitutionality.  
 
In regard to the constitutional veto in Hungary we should point out the parliament’s 
power to refer an adopted law (at the proposal of the Government, proponent of the law 
or Speaker of the parliament) to the Constitutional Court for a constitutional review. In 
such cases the President of the Republic may no longer exercise the right of 
constitutional veto. The President may thus exercise the right of constitutional veto if 
the parliament did not already call on the Constitutional Court to rule on the 
constitutionality of the law.
49
 The ruling made by the Constitutional Court based on the 
President’s constitutional veto is final and must be followed by the promulgation of the 
law. Using constitutional veto thus excludes the option of using legislative veto. 
However, if the Constitutional Court rules that the law is not unconstitutional following 
the parliament’s request for a constitutional review, the President may exercise the right 
of legislative veto before promulgating the law. On the other hand, using legislative 
veto first does not exclude the option of using constitutional veto later. An already 
vetoed law may thus also be referred to the Constitutional Court. We should distinguish 
between two situations here, namely whether the parliament adopted the law without 
any modifications or the law was modified. In the first case the President may request 
that the Constitutional Court rules whether the legislators adopted the law in accordance 
with the prescribed procedure. In the second case the President may request not only a 
constitutional review of the procedure but also of the content, in which case only the 
amended provisions are reviewed.  
 
Estonia also stands out among the examined countries that grant the President the right 
of constitutional veto, allowing the President to exercise the right of legislative and 
constitutional veto for the same law. If the parliament readopts a law without any 
amendments, the President of the Republic may refer the law to the Supreme Court 
(which also fulfils the role of the constitutional court) for a constitutional review. If the 
Supreme Court rules the law constitutional, the President of the Republic promulgates 
it. In the Estonian system the President holds the right of constitutional veto; they must 
however first use legislative veto. This gives the President of Estonia a lot of influence 
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In certain systems (such as Latvia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) the 
President has the right to request a constitutional review of the law after its 
promulgation and its coming into force.
51
 This does not represent a constitutional veto 
but an ex post constitutional review of a law. As an instrument for protecting the 
constitutionality, such constitutional review is less effective than the constitutional veto, 
which can prevent an unconstitutional law from coming into force. The President of 
Lithuania has the least power in regard to this, as they only hold the right to demand a 




3.1.3 Powers of the President of the Republic of Slovenia 
 
When it comes to the powers of the President before and after the legislative procedure, 
the Slovenian system grants the President the least power among all the examined 
systems. The right of legislative initiative is granted to the same entities
53
 as in most 
other parliamentary systems, so strengthening the President’s office with the right of 
legislative initiative is questionable. Presidents rarely exercise this right, and the fate of 
the proposed draft bill depends entirely on the will of the parliament. 
 
If changes were to be introduced regarding the President’s powers, they should be 
connected to the promulgation of laws. The Slovenian system is the only one among the 
examined that does not grant the President the right of legislative or constitutional veto. 
In the Slovenian system the right of suspensive (legislative) veto is granted to the 
National Council, which may send a law to the National Assembly for reconsideration 




For some time Slovenian legal experts have been advocating strengthening the office of 
the President with the right of constitutional veto (following the Hungarian example).
55 
This would introduce ex ante constitutional review into our system, wherefore 
introducing the right of the President to request a constitutional review of an existing 
bill would be a minor encroachment on the constitution.
56
 Thus the President would 
only be able to launch a constitutional review of a law after its promulgation and its 
coming into force.
57
 This kind of arrangement is already established in all the examined 
countries where the President does not enjoy the right of constitutional veto (except for 
Lithuania). Here it must be considered that Presidents usually exercise their use of 
legislative veto more often than refer a law to the Constitutional Court.  
 
In regard to this fact the question arises as to what authority the President actually has in 
promulgating a law. According to the Constitutional Court’s decision, the President has 
the indisputable right to a formal review of constitutionality. Some think that the 
President also has the right to a substantive review of constitutionality (especially in the 
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event of obvious unconstitutionality).
58 
Here it should be stressed that in 2001 the 
Constitutional Court defined purely procedural constitutional barriers as those on 
account of which the President could refuse promulgation of the law.
59
 Thus in its 
decision it stressed that the President promulgates the law at the latest 8 days after its 
adoption, if there are no constitutional barriers related to its creation and if it is certain 
that the law has been adopted. Promulgation is the very act of determining that, in 
collaboration with all eligible parties according to the Constitution, the law has been 
created and thus exists. In other words, the Slovenian President may conduct a limited 
formal (procedural) review of a law’s constitutionality and refuse its promulgation if it 
was not adopted by the National Assembly or was not adopted by a constitutionally 
determined majority, or if there exists the possibility of suspensive veto from the 
National Council or a subsequent legislative referendum.
60 
Taking into account the right 
of the National Council to submit a veto, and the request of authorized applicants for a 
subsequent legislative referendum, the eighth day is the earliest and latest that the 
President can and must promulgate the law. Therefore if there are no formal 
constitutional barriers, we assert that the President may not refuse promulgation of the 
law.
61
 On the basis of the decision examined above, the Constitutional Court did not 
recognize the President’s right to constitutional veto, but merely explained that 
promulgation of a law is not a routine act that the President must perform sans 
objection.
62
 As already stated, the theory is not consistent as regards the right to 
substantive review of a law’s constitutionality. Some maintain that the President may 
not promulgate an obviously unconstitutional law, as doing so would violate the 
constitution, which the President is sworn to uphold by the nature of their office. Thus 
refusing to promulgate an unconstitutional law, which e.g. might introduce capital 
punishment, is not a violation of the President’s constitutional obligations.
63
 It is 
impossible to fully accept such a position, as it would confer upon the President a veto 
right such as we do not recognize in our system.  
 
Two questions arise regarding the presidential promulgation of a law, specifically what 
the President’s obligations are in the event of refusal to promulgate a law (including 
when the President’s opinion is that the law is obviously unconstitutional), and the 
question of the ultimate fate of such an unpromulgated law. Most likely, in the event of 
the refusal to promulgate a law due to reasons of content, the National Assembly would 
bring action against the President before the Constitutional Court. Such a law would 
nevertheless go unpromulgated. It would thus make sense in this sort of situation for the 
President of the National Assembly to assume promulgation, as is expressly determined 




3.1.4 Powers Related to Referenda 
 
In the majority of the systems examined the President has significant or minor powers 
related to referenda. These powers give the President an influence on the most important 
type of direct democracy, ensuring the participation of citizens in adopting key legal and 
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political decisions, which are otherwise within the powers of the administration.
65
 A 
distinction may be made between those countries where the President is competent 
merely to call a referendum, and countries where the President can also launch or 
demand the launch of a referendum. The Slovak Constitution says that the President can 
call a referendum if it is demanded by 350,000 voters or by parliament. Before calling 
the referendum, the Slovak President may call upon the Constitutional Court to rule 
whether or not the subject of the referendum is compliant with the Constitution or not. 
The Bulgarian President also calls a referendum after parliament adopts a resolution on 
a national referendum. The Hungarian, Romanian, and Polish Presidents enjoy stronger 
powers; in Hungary the President may propose a referendum, and parliamentary 
deputies make a final decision. The Romanian system differs: there the President 
decides (after consulting with parliament) about calling a referendum. The Polish 
President also has the right to call a referendum at their own initiative, if a majority of 




3.2 Calling Parliamentary Elections and Convening Parliament 
 
The President’s right to call parliamentary elections can be described initially as an 
obligation, as the President is bound to call elections when conditions thereof are met. 
This is a common presidential power in parliamentary systems. It is also generally the 
President’s powers to convene the (constitutive) sitting of parliament. Although this is a 
“historical” power, when the king was forced to convene parliament whenever he 
needed financial aid, today this makes it possible for the President to have an influence 
on the operations of the legislative body. 
 
3.2.1 Calling Parliamentary Elections 
 
The majority of the systems examined determine that calling parliamentary elections is 
among the President’s powers.
67
 The situation is different in Romania, where this is the 
government’s power, in Slovakia, where the President of parliament calls elections, and 
in Latvia, where elections are called by the Central Election Commission.
68
 This, which 
at first glance appears to be merely a formal right, can have a direct effect on the 
composition of the future parliament. The majority of systems determine a time frame in 
which the President can call elections. Thus potential speculation, considering the 
greater or lesser popularity of a given political party at a given moment, is possible. In 
considering when to call elections, political concerns are naturally given preference, e.g. 
holidays or vacations, etc., but these circumstances can also be political, as they can 
affect voter turnout and thereby also the outcome of the elections themselves.
69
 This sort 
of influence is not to be found in those systems where the President does have available 
a (longer) time frame to call elections and determine a day for votes. Estonia and 
Lithuania are good examples, as election day is determined in the Constitution. There 
the President has more “freedom” and as a result has greater influence only in calling 
potential early elections.  
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3.2.2 Convening Parliament 
 
In all of the systems examined (except in Latvia),
70
 the President has the right to 
convene the first sitting of the newly elected parliament.
71
 Individual systems differ 
among themselves only in terms of the time in which the President is obligated to call 
the constitutive sitting. This time frame is 30 days in the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, and Bulgaria, while Romania has 20 days, and the shortest deadline of 15 days 
is in Lithuania. This deadline in these systems begins on the day of elections. Otherwise 
in Slovakia and Estonia, where the President must call the first parliamentary sitting 
within 30 and 10 days, respectively, from the day the electoral results are announced. 
Some constitutions contain a provision where the parliament, in the event that the 
President fails to call a sitting in due time, can convene at its own initiative. This holds 
true for the Czech, Slovak, Lithuanian, and Bulgarian (where in this case at least one-
fifth of the deputies are required to convene a sitting) Constitutions. 
 
In the majority of the countries considered the President has the right to call a (regular 
or special) parliamentary sitting or to request one be called, if the President of the 
representative body is competent to do so. The Bulgarian and Latvian Presidents can 
request that a parliamentary sitting be called; in Lithuania and Estonia the President has 
the right to call or request a call only for a special parliamentary sitting.
72
 Considering 
the indisputable system of the representative bodies in Romania and the Czech 
Republic, their Presidents have the right to call a special sitting of the Chamber of 
Deputies or the Senate.
73
 There is also the example of Slovakia, where only the 




3.2.3 Powers of the President of the Republic of Slovenia 
 
The President calls elections to the National Assembly, calls the sitting of the newly 
elected National Assembly, and can also request that a special sitting be called.
75
 The 
President calls regular elections with a special act, the decree on holding elections.
76
 
The Constitution determines that a new National Assembly is elected no sooner than 2 
months and no later than 15 days before the expiration of a 4-year term from the first 
sitting of the previous National Assembly. Otherwise in the event of early elections, 
which are held whenever the National Assembly is dissolved before the expiration of 
the regular 4-year term, the President calls (early) elections with an act on the 
dissolution of the National Assembly. Such elections must be held no later than 2 
months after the dissolution of the National Assembly, but no sooner than 40 days from 
the day of the announcement. The first sitting of a new National Assembly is called by 
the President no later than 20 days after the President is elected. The President of the 
National Assembly calls regular and special sittings, and must call a special sitting if so 
requested by the President (or by at least a quarter of the Deputies in the National 
Assembly). Based on an examination powers, we find that the Slovenian President does 
not stand out in this aspect from other comparable systems.  
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3.3 Dissolution of Parliament 
 
The dissolution of parliament and the calling of early elections is not just the right of the 
President, but also an obligation in some systems under certain circumstances. This type 
of presidential power is most often conditional with parliament’s inability to form a 
government, or due to a parliamentary vote of no confidence in the government. 
Although constitutions provide parliaments with a range of mechanisms for forming a 
government, when all have been unsuccessfully exhausted, nothing else remains but to 
call new elections. Until new elections are called, the government may well receive a 
vote of no confidence from the deputies, as the government and parliament, considering 
the fundamental characteristics of the parliamentary system, cannot function one 
without the other. 
 
When it is impossible to form a government, the President must dissolve parliament 
only in three eastern European Member States of the EU, namely Poland, Bulgaria, and 
Estonia.
77
 The Bulgarian President is an exception, as in such circumstances the 
President names a technocratic government, which happened in 1997. Between the 
dissolution of parliament and the holding of early elections, the President practically 
runs the government alone, as the technical government, which otherwise yields to the 
newly elected parliament, reports to the President.
78
 It is different in the majority of the 
examined countries where the President decides whether or not to dissolve parliament 
when it proves impossible to put together a government. The President has such a right 
in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Romania.  
 
When the government loses the support of parliament during a term, either due to an 
actual vote of no confidence or an assumed vote of no confidence, parliament may be 
dissolved at the President’s discretion in Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and 
Slovakia. In this regard only the Slovenian system is exceptional, as the President must 
dissolved parliament whenever it issues a vote of no confidence.  
 
In addition to the reasons for dissolving parliament which have already been stated, 
which are connected to the inability to form a government or the loss of parliamentary 
suppose, in Poland, Hungary, and Estonia parliament may be dissolved if it does not 
approve the state budget in due time. Here it should be noted that in this case, only the 
Estonian President is also obligated to dissolve parliament and call early elections. The 
Czech Republic and Slovak systems also provide for the dissolution of parliament as 
another possible solution in the event of other internal political difficulties. Parliament 
may be dissolved if it fails to convene or fails to convene with a quorum for a 
significant amount of time. A system in which parliament may be directly dissolved by 
referendum is known only in Latvia.
79
 A referendum on the dissolution of parliament 
can be requested by the President and one-tenth of voters. In two countries parliament 
may also be dissolved as a consequence of a previously adopted decision of voters at a 
referendum. Thus the Estonian President must call early parliamentary election if voters 
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at a legislative referendum fail to confirm an adopted bill; in Slovakia the President 
dissolves Parliament if a referendum fails to get enough votes to recall the President.  
 
In general the President only dissolves the lower house of parliament. The Czech 
Constitution determines that, when the Chamber of Deputies is dissolved, the Senate 
has the right for urgent matters to adopt legal acts with the force of law, which are then 
signed into law by the President of the Senate, the President, and the Prime Minister.
80
 It 
is different in Poland, where the result of early termination to the term of the Chamber 
of Deputies results in the dissolution of the Senate as well. It is also different in 
Romania, where the President dissolves all of parliament if it proves impossible to form 
a government. 
 
Considering situations where the dissolution of parliament is permissible and limitations 
thereto, as well as whether the President may dissolve parliament at their own discretion 
or they must consider the will of other bodies, or are even obliged to dissolve the 
parliament immediately when the conditions for dissolution are met, it can be said with 
conviction that the Slovenian President has the weakest powers in this area. 
 
3.3.1 Limitations in Dissolving Parliament 
 
Half of the eastern European countries considered set time limits when it is impossible 
to dissolve parliament. Generally this limitation is connected with the expiration of the 
President’s term. Only in the Czech Republic is the President’s right to dissolved 
parliament “conditional” upon the term of said parliament, specifically of the Chamber 
of Deputies, which the President cannot dissolve in the last 3 months of its term.
81
 The 
Slovak and Bulgarian Presidents cannot dissolve parliament at the end of their own 
terms (the Slovak President cannot dissolve the legislative body in the last 6 month of 
their term; in Bulgaria this time limit is shorter, at 3 months).
82
 In Lithuania early 
elections cannot be called until 6 months have passed from the previous early elections, 




The obligation of working with other decision-making bodies is also among the 
limitations on the President’s powers for dissolving parliament. The President cannot 
act strictly according to their own judgment in Hungary, Poland, and Romania, but must 
coordinate with the government and/or parliament. The Hungarian President must 
consult with the Prime Minister, the President of parliament, and the Presidents of the 
parliamentary parties before dissolving parliament.
84
 A similar situation holds true in 
Poland, where the President must consult with the Presidents of both houses.
85
 As 
regards the dissolution of parliament, the Romanian Constitution determines two 
conditions, in addition to obligatory consultation with the Presidents of both houses and 
of parliamentary parties: the President may not dissolve parliament in the last 6 months 
of their term, and parliament may be dissolved just once per year.
86
 The Latvian and 
Estonian Constitutions do not contain the mentioned limitations.  
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3.3.2 Dissolution of Parliament due to Inability to Form A Government 
 
Dissolution of parliament is generally listed as the ultimate consequence of its inability 
to form a government. Put differently, the decision to dissolve is made only after all 
other options to successfully put together a government have been exhausted. The 
Presidents of Poland, Bulgaria, and Estonia must dissolve parliament if it fails in 
forming a government.
87
 Regarding the Polish system it bears emphasis that the Polish 
President (after previous consultation with the Presidents of both Houses) dissolves only 
the Chamber of Deputies (the first House of parliament), but the early termination of the 
term of the Chamber of Deputies consequentially implies the end of the Senate’s term as 
well. In these three systems the President must dissolve parliament if the statutory 
conditions are met. 
 
The situation is different in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and 
Lithuania, where the President can dissolve parliament if it fails in forming a 
government. In doing so, the Romanian and Hungarian Presidents must consult with the 
legislative branch of government before dissolution, and the Hungarian President must 
also consult with the Prime Minister. The Hungarian President may (following a prior 
opinion) dissolve parliament if it fails to elect the President’s candidate for Prime 
Minister. The President loses this right when the Prime Minister is elected.
88
 In 
Romania (following prior consultation), after consultation with the Presidents of both 
Chambers and the leaders of the parliamentary groups, the President of Romania may 
dissolve Parliament if no vote of confidence has been obtained to form a government 
within 60 days after the first request was made, and only after rejection of at least two 
requests for investiture.
89
 The Czech President can dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, if 
it fails in the final (third) round to cast a vote of investiture.
90
 In Slovakia the President 
can dissolve parliament if it fails to adopt the government’s programme within six 
months of the government’s constitution.
91
 In Lithuania as well, the President can 
dissolve President and call early elections if the government’s plan fails to be adopted 
within the statutory time frame.
92
 So far there has been no early dissolution of the 
Lithuanian parliament. It also bears consideration that the President’s decision on the 
dissolution of the Lithuanian parliament is considered by a newly elected parliament.
93
 
When the President calls early parliamentary elections, a newly elected parliament with 
a three-fifths majority of all deputies (within 30 days of its first sitting) can call early 




3.3.3 Dissolution of Parliament due to Loss of Support in Parliament 
 
Parliament may also be dissolved due to a loss of support for the government therein. In 
a parliamentary system these two bodies are inextricably linked, as parliament cannot 
exist without the government and vice versa. If there is a dispute between them, both the 
government and parliament can be replaced.
95
 Thus a government which loses 
parliamentary support must step down, and the parliament can recommend that the 
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President dissolve parliament, which is the case in Estonia and Lithuania.
96
 In the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia parliament may be dissolved if it fails to adopt a law to which 
the government tied a question of confidence.
97
 The Czech President may also dissolve 
the Chamber of Deputies if within 3 months they fail to decide on a law to which the 
government has tied a vote of confidence. The Slovak Constitution contains a similar 
provision. By tying a question of confidence to a given law, the government attempts to 
ensure sufficient support for its draft bill, as the threat of dissolving parliament has an 
influence on the deputies. In all the systems mentioned (Estonian, Lithuanian, Czech, 
and Slovak) the final decision to dissolve parliament or not lies with the President. The 
Slovenian system is unique in this regard, as it is the only one to obligate the President 
to dissolve the National Assembly if it fails to issue a vote of confidence. 
 
3.3.4 Dissolution of Parliament for Other Reasons 
 
Certain systems determine that parliament may be dissolved if the budget is not 
accepted or if the operations of the legislative body are somehow “blocked” or 
prevented from working. The Polish President can dissolve the Chamber of Deputies if 
it fails to accept the state budget in due time (within 4 months of the submitted 
proposal).
 98
 The Hungarian Constitution contains a similar provision, where the 
President can dissolve parliament if it fails to approve the current year’s budget in due 
time (by 31 March). The President loses this possibility the day the budget is 
approved.
99
 The Estonian President’s powers are different than the Polish and 
Hungarian counterparts, in that early elections must be called if within 2 months from 
the beginning of the financial year the budget goes unapproved.
100
 The Czech President 
can dissolve the Chamber of Deputies if it is prevented from convening longer than is 
admissible (more than 120 days), or if it meets without a quorum for more than 3 
months.
101
 In the 2 examples mentioned, the President is not obligated to dissolve 
parliament, but can seek a different solution.
102




In Latvia the right to dissolve parliament is not conditional upon parliament’s inability 
to form a government, or due to a parliamentary majority vote of no confidence in the 
government.
104
 The President can propose the dissolution of parliament at any time, 
whereupon a referendum follows.
105
 The President’s decision is adopted if it is voted for 
by a majority of those who cast votes.
106 
New parliamentary elections follow, to be held 
no more than 2 months after dissolution. In the interim the President calls sittings of 
parliament, and also determines the schedule of affairs. If the majority of those voting in 
the referendum cast votes against dissolution, then it is the President who is disposed – 
the deputies then vote on a new President for the rest of the disposed President’s term.  
 
At the end of May 2011 (5 days before presidential elections) the Latvian President 
proposed the dissolution of parliament. The Latvian Constitution does not contain time 
limits on when the President can no longer propose such. Thus it is possible that the 
President proposes to dissolve parliament on the last day of the President’s term. Of 
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course this would make the President’s re-election questionable on the part of a 
parliament which is threatened with dissolution.
 
Parliament retains all of its powers 
from the day when the President submits a proposal for dissolution to the end of the 
voters’ decision. Thus parliament legitimately voted on a new President in the 
beginning of June.
107
 A referendum on dissolving parliament was then held within the 
statutory 2-month time limit, at the end of July, where in voter turnout of 45% of 




In contrast to Latvia, in Estonia and Slovakia parliament may be dissolved early by 
referendum only indirectly. The Estonian President calls early parliamentary elections 
when voters at a legislative referendum called by parliament fail to adopt an approved 
bill. The law is adopted if voted for by a majority of those voters who participated in the 





Early dissolution of parliament may be (indirectly) upheld on a referendum in Slovakia, 
where the President will dissolve parliament if a referendum on the recall of the 
President from office fails. This type of referendum is called by the President of 
parliament, if three-fifths of all deputies support such a decision. The President is then 
considered removed from office, if more than half of eligible voters at a referendum cast 
votes to that effect. If the President is not voted out of office, the President dissolves 




3.3.5 Powers of the President of the Republic of Slovenia 
 
If a government cannot be formed, the Slovenian President must dissolve parliament. 
Dissolving the National Assembly is not just the President’s right, but also an obligation 
if certain conditions or circumstances arise as determined by the Constitution.
111
 Similar 
systems are present in only three of the examined countries, specifically Poland, 
Bulgaria, and Estonia. In the other countries, when it is impossible to form a 
government, the President can decide to dissolve parliament or not. A comprehensive 
analysis shows that the Slovenian system is comparable only to the Bulgarian one, as 
the Polish and Estonian Presidents also have the option of dissolving parliament in other 
situations when the government or parliament is not fulfilling their obligations 
competently. What is more, of all the Presidents examined, only the Slovenian President 
is obligated to dissolve parliament if the government fails to receive a vote of 
confidence. It is different, e.g., in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where the President 
makes a decision at their own discretion. 
 
The Slovenian President dissolves the National Assembly in two cases: when the 
National Assembly in the second or third round fails to appoint a Prime Minister, or if 
after the National Assembly fails to issue a vote of confidence in the government it fails 
to name a new Prime Minister or if it in a new round of voting casts a vote of 
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confidence in the current President.
112 
In addition to the aforementioned the National 
Assembly may also be dissolved due to the resignation of the Prime Minister. However 
in this case it is not automatic: the National Assembly is dissolved only if it fails to vote 
a new Prime Minister.
113
 In summary: when there arises a circumstance as determined 
by the Constitution as a condition for the dissolution of the National Assembly, the 




Given the aforementioned, it can be said with certainty that the relationship between the 
executive and legislative branches in the Slovenian constitutional system differs from 
the fundamental parliamentary concept to the extent that the position of the President is 
weakened to the point where the office does not come with the proper authorizations to 
actually resolve an impasse in the government, which can only occur as the result of 
conflicts between parliament and the administration.
115
 Some legal theoreticians tend to 
believe that the President should have the right to dissolve the National Assembly after 
hearing the opinions of the President of the National Assembly, the National Council, 
and the Prime Minister.
116
 Even more appropriate would probably be a solution like in 
the German system, which also contains the institution of the constructive vote of no 
confidence, which indubitably influences the role of the President in resolving disputes 




4 Executive Powers 
 
The President’s executive powers are the powers based on which a relationship is 
established between the President and the government. The President’s powers in 
appointing the Prime Minister and ministers are without a doubt the most important in 
this regard. Furthermore, the President in all new European Union democracies in 
general also has the power to appoint the highest state officials or nominate them for 
election or appointment by the representative body.  
 
In only a few of the examined countries the President may also participate in 
government sessions. This is a power that allows the President to significantly influence 
the government politics. This power is held by Presidents in the Czech Republic, 
Romania, and Latvia. The Czech President has the right to participate in government 
sessions, request reports from the government, and discuss issues under their 
jurisdiction with the government and individual ministers.
118
 The powers of the 
Romanian President are limited in this area, as they may only participate in the 
government sessions when issues of national interest, issues related to the country’s 
foreign policy and defense, and issues of protecting public order are discussed. When 
the Romanian President attends a government session, they also chair it.
119
 The 
President’s powers in this area are even more restricted in Latvia, where the President 
holds the right to convene a special government session, determine the agenda, and 
chair the session, but not the right to vote.
120
 The Latvian President will convene a 
special session only in emergency situations.
121
 It should also be noted that after 
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amendments were made to the country’s Constitution in 1999, the Slovakian President 




In the examined systems, a wider extent of executive powers is also held by the 
Lithuanian and Polish Presidents. The Lithuanian President holds the right to, in the 
event of the Prime Minister’s absence, appoint a minister who will temporarily 
substitute for them. If the Prime Minister does not nominate a candidate, the President 
may choose one freely. The Constitution determines that such a substitution may only 
last up to 60 days.
123
 We should also highlight the provision of the Lithuanian 
Constitution, which determines that the government is jointly responsible to the 
parliament, while individual ministers are responsible to the parliament and the Prime 
Minister, as well as the President.
124
 The Polish system recognizes the institute of 
Cabinet Council, which the President may convene as an advisory body in matters of 
special importance. This council, which comprises members of the government, more 
precisely members of the Council of Ministers, and is presided over by the President, 
does not have the powers held by the Council of Ministers, and the Constitution does 




4.1 President’s Powers in Forming the Government 
 
Based on the role of the President in forming the government, we can divide the 
examined systems into three types. In the first type of system, the President has the 
power to appoint the Prime Minister and ministers; in the second type of the system the 
President appoints ministers and nominates a candidate for the Prime Minister, who is 
then elected by the parliament; while in the third type of the system, which is the 
furthest away from the principle of the separation of powers, the President does not 





The majority of new European Union democracies use the traditional model of forming 
the government, in which the President appoints the Prime Minister, who must then 
(alone or with an already formed government) win a vote of confidence in parliament. 
The model used in Romania and Estonia is somewhat different; there the President first 
nominates a candidate for the Prime Minister, and only appoints the government (as a 
collective body) after the vote of confidence – investiture. The President’s actual 
influence on the formation of the government depends on whether they are independent 
in selecting the Prime Minister, or limited by the obligation of respecting the will of the 
parliament. This is formally regulated only in Romania and Latvia, but naturally the 
President must also respect the election results in other countries, since the government 
depends on the parliament in its work. The role of the legislative body is even bigger in 
the countries (such as Poland, Czech Republic and Estonia), where the parliament may 
appoint the Prime Minister, if the President’s candidate does not garner sufficient 
support. In other words, some systems give more powers in the formation of parliament 
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to the President, while others to the parliament itself. A system where the role of the 
President is significantly weakened and the role of the parliament is strengthened is in 
place only in three of the ten examined countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovenia. In 
these three countries the President does not appoint the Prime Minister, but only 
nominates a candidate that the parliament then votes on.  
 
Considering the aforementioned, the analyzed countries may be divided into two 
groups. The first group comprises countries where the Prime Minister is appointed by 
the President, and the second, smaller group, countries where the Prime Minister is 
elected by the legislative body. Countries can be further divided into those where the 
right to appoint (or nominate a candidate for) the Prime Minister is held exclusively by 
the President, and those where they share this power with others who can nominate 
candidates. Countries can also be classified by the extent of independence enjoyed by 
the President in making this decision. We can divide these countries into those where 
the President is formally obliged to work with the parliament or respect its will when 
appointing (or nominating a candidate for) the Prime Minister, and those where the 
President’s choice is only restricted by the specifics of the parliamentary system. 
 
4.1.1 Appointing the Prime Minister 
 
In Romania, the President nominates a candidate for the Prime Minister after consulting 
with parliamentary parties or the party that won the absolute majority.
127
 This candidate 
then has ten days to present the composition of the government, and its program to the 
parliament. The parliament then votes on the motion of confidence, for which the 
absolute majority of votes from deputies and senators is required, after which the 
President appoints the government. If the parliament does not give a vote of confidence 
to the government, the candidate must return the authority for forming the government 
to the President, who then nominates a new candidate. It is a peculiarity of the 
Romanian system that both houses of the parliament are involved in the formation of 
the government, as a result of which the President has the power to dissolve the entire 
parliament, if a vote of no confidence is not passed in a specified time. The Constitution 
also regulates in more detail the government reshuffle, when the President dismisses a 
minister and appoints a new one at the proposal of the Prime Minister. If this were to 
change the political composition of the government, an approval by the parliament is 
required.
128
 Before it was amended in 2003, the Constitution did not prescribe this 
approval, which led to questions about the legitimacy of the reshuffled government, as 
the vote of confidence was given to a specific composition of the government. Due to 
negative past experience, a provision determining that the President cannot dismiss the 




Similarly, the Lithuanian President must also respect the will of the parliament, since 
the Constitution determines that the Prime Minister is appointed by the President with 
the approval of parliament. As a rule, the selection of the Prime Minister is determined 
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by the strongest party.
130
 The President then appoints ministers at the proposal of the 
Prime Minister. Within 15 days of the appointment, the Prime Minister must present the 
government and its program to the parliament, which takes a vote of confidence. If a 





The Polish President enjoys greater independence in this area, since the country’s 
Constitution does not specify that the President should respect the election outcome 
when appointing the Prime Minister, however they must take into account the fact that 
the government depends on the parliament in its work. The Polish President’s powers in 
forming the Government were much broader under the Constitution of 1992, when the 
semi-presidential system was in place in the country.
132
 After the new Constitution was 
adopted in 1997 and the parliamentary system was introduced, the office of President 
lost its decisive influence on the selection of ministers.
133 
The President can now only 
influence government policy with the legislative veto (which is hard to overturn).
134
 
Under the Polish Constitution, the President has the power to appoint the Prime 
Minister, and, at the Prime Minister’s proposal, individual ministers, which must be 
done within fourteen days of the first session of the newly elected parliament.
135
 The 
government must then present its program and seek a vote of confidence from the Sejm 
within two weeks. The Sejm must approve the government with an absolute majority of 
the votes and with at least one half of the deputies present. If the President fails to 
appoint a government within the aforementioned deadline, or if the government is not 
given a vote of confidence in the parliament, the parliament takes charge. The new 
Prime Minister is elected by the Sejm at the proposal of at least 46 deputies. The Prime 
Minister elected with an absolute majority of votes then presents the ministers and the 
government program to the parliament. If the government is granted the vote of 
confidence, it is (formally) appointed by the President. If the government is not formed 
in this attempt, it is again the President’s turn to appoint the Prime Minister (and 
ministers at the proposal of the Prime Minister). This time only simple majority of the 
votes with at least one half of the deputies present is needed for the vote of confidence. 
If the government does not garner sufficient support in the parliament in the third 
attempt, Sejm and consequently Senate are dismissed instead of forming a minority 
government. The Polish President’s powers upon the resignation of the government, 
which are broader compared to the powers of presidents in other examined systems, 
should also be highlighted here. The President must accept the government’s 
resignation, if the Sejm passes a vote of no confidence or fails to pass a vote of 
confidence, or when a newly elected parliament convenes for its first session.
136
 If the 
government resigns as the result of Prime Minister’s resignation, the President has the 




In Estonia the system is somewhat different than in Poland, and the parliament has the 
right to nominate a candidate for the Prime Minister in the third, and not the second 
attempt. In Estonia, a new candidate for the Prime Minister is nominated by the 
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President within 14 days of the government’s resignation.
138
 If the candidate wins a vote 
of confidence in the parliament, they form a government and present it to the President 
for the appointment within seven days. If the candidate nominated by the President is 
not approved by the parliament, or if they fail to form a government, the President may 
nominate a new candidate. If the President does not nominate a new candidate, or if the 
second candidate does not win a vote of confidence or fails to form the government, the 
right to nominate a candidate for the Prime Minister is passed onto the parliament. The 
candidate selected by the parliament must form the government and present it to the 
President for appointment. If the government is not formed in this attempt, the President 




In Czech Republic, the Chamber of Deputies may also play and active role in 
appointing the Prime Minister. If the government fails to win the vote of confidence in 
the Chamber of Deputies within 30 days of its appointment by the President, the 
procedure is repeated – the President appoints the Prime Minister and individual 
ministers at the Prime Minister’s proposal. If the government fails to win a vote of 
confidence for the second time, the President appoints the Prime Minister at the 
proposal of the Chairman of Chamber of Deputies. If the vote of confidence is not 




The President’s position in forming the government is somewhat stronger in Slovakia 
and Latvia, where the right to nominate the Prime Minister is not passed to the 
parliament. The Constitutions also do not expressly determine that the President should 
respect the election results when selecting the Prime Minister.
141
 This procedure is 
comparable to other systems. The President appoints the Prime Minister and the 
ministers at the Prime Minister’s proposal, and the government must win a vote of 
confidence in parliament.  
 
In the majority of examined systems the President is also responsible for dismissing the 
Prime Minister and individual ministers.
142
 This responsibility correlates to the 
President’s right to appoint the Prime Minister and other ministers, although the power 
related to dismissal is only formal, since the President is bound by a prior decision of 
the parliament or Prime Minister. Czech President dismisses individual government 
ministers at the proposal of the Prime Minister. The President can also dismiss the entire 
government, when the government that should resign refuses to do so.
143
 The system is 
similar in Slovakia, where the President dismisses the government if the parliament 
passes a vote of no confidence, or fails to pass a vote of confidence. The Slovak 
President also dismisses individual ministers at the proposal of the Prime Minister or if 
the parliament passes a vote of no confidence against them.
144
 Presidents in Estonia, 
Poland, and Lithuania have the same powers in this regard, with the Lithuanian 
President only accepting the minister’s resignation if the parliament passes a vote of no 
confidence against them.
145
 The Romanian Constitution, under which the President is 
responsible for dismissing individual ministers at the proposal of the Prime Minister, 
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also specifically regulates the situation in which the political composition of the 
government should change due to the dismissal of several ministers, in which case the 
approval of parliament is required. Among the studied constitutions, the Romanian 





4.1.2 Nominating Candidates for Prime Minister 
 
In only three of the examined new European Union democracies, the President 
nominates the candidate for the Prime Minister to be elected by the parliament – in 
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovenia. In these countries, investiture is not required, as it is 
replaced by the vote. The Bulgarian system is somewhat specific, as it still requires the 
vote of confidence, which additionally ties the work of the government to the 
parliament. 
In Hungary the President nominates a candidate for Prime Minister, to be elected by the 
parliament. If the candidate is not elected, the President must nominate a new candidate 
within 15 days. If the parliament does not elect the President’s candidate within 40 days 
of the first vote, the President may dissolve the parliament. The Prime Minister takes 
office on the day of their election, and the government is constituted when the President 




In Bulgaria, the Prime Minister is also elected by the parliament following the 
President’s nomination.
148
 Unlike in Hungary, the Bulgarian President must consult 
with parliamentary parties and respect their opinion before nominating the candidate for 
the Prime Minister. The formation of government in Bulgaria can be divided into pre-
parliamentary and parliamentary phases. After consulting with the political parties, the 
President authorizes the candidate proposed by the largest party to present the 
composition of the government. If the candidate fails to present the composition of the 
government within seven days, the President gives the same authorization to the 
candidate nominated by the second largest parliamentary party. If the second candidate 
fails to present the composition of the government within seven days, the President may 
call on any of the smaller parliamentary parties to nominate their candidate. In this third 
round, the President is not obliged to consider the proposals of political parties.
149
 In 
1992, the candidate from the smallest parliamentary party became the Prime Minister.
150
 
If the candidate succeeds in forming the government, the President then nominates them 
to be elected by the parliament. The deputies first elect the Prime Minister, and then 
vote on the entire government proposed by the Prime Minister. If they elect the Prime 
Minister but vote against the government as a whole, it is deemed that the new 
government was not formed. The parliament also has the power to dismiss the Prime 
Minister and individual ministers at the proposal of the Prime Minister.
151
 This method 
of forming the government gives the legislative body greater influence and control, so in 
Bulgaria the role of the parliament is not strengthened only in its relation to the Prime 
Minister, but also in its relation to the government as a whole. When a government 
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cannot be formed, the President appoints a caretaker government, dissolves the 
parliament, and calls snap election, which happened in 1997. During the time between 
the dissolution of parliament and the snap election, the President practically runs the 
government, as the caretaker government, which must offer its resignation to the newly 




4.1.3 Powers of The President of Slovenia in the Formation of Government 
 
Under the Slovenian Constitution, the President has the right to nominate a candidate 
for Prime Minister to be elected by the National Assembly (after consulting with heads 
of deputy groups).
153 
The President thus has very limited power in proposing candidates 
in the formation of government.
154
 If the nominated candidate is not elected, the 
President may repeat the consultation process and nominate another or the same 
candidate within 14 days, and candidates may also be nominated by deputy groups or a 
group of at least ten deputies.
155
 If several candidates are nominated within this 
deadline, the vote is taken on each candidate individually, starting with the candidate 
nominated by the President, and then, if this candidate is not elected, votes on other 
candidates in the same order as the nominations were filed. If none of the candidates is 
elected, the President dissolves the National Assembly and calls a new election, unless 
the National Assembly decides to take vote on the Prime Minister again within 48 
hours, in which case a majority of votes cast by the deputies present suffices. 
Accordingly, the Slovenian President cannot prevent the formation of a minority 
government. If none of the candidates is elected even in this vote, the President 




Under the Slovenian Constitution, the President may propose a candidate for Prime 
Minister three times. In the first round this is their obligation and they are the sole 
proponent, while in the second and third round their nomination is optional, and others 
may also file their nominations.
157
 The question arises, however, as to the likelihood of 
the President actually influencing the selection of the Prime Minister.
158
 The following 
applies: the greater the diversity and dispersion in the political arena, and consequently 
the weaker the coalition, the more important is the role of the President.
159
 Of course the 
President will nominate candidates for Prime Minister who have realistic chance of 
winning the necessary majority in the National Assembly. The National Assembly then 
appoints and dismisses ministers of the government at the proposal of the elected Prime 
Minister (Article 112 of the Constitution).  
 
Under the Constitution, the National Assembly actually decides on the government 
twice, which decreases the Prime Minister-designate’s chance of forming a competent 
government, and assuming total responsibility for its work. This exaggerated electoral 
function of the National Assembly puts the government in a position that is in many 
aspects closer to the position of an executive body in an assembly system than to the 
position of the government in a parliamentary system.
160
 The remnants of this mentality 
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are best reflected in the fact that ministers are appointed and dismissed by the National 
Assembly at the proposal of the Prime Minister.
161
 This method of appointing ministers 
may result in a government comprised of ministers who won a majority in the 
parliament, instead of ministers whom the Prime Minister finds best and most 
competent.
162
 The hearing of candidates before relevant parliamentary commissions and 
committees, which is based on the American system, is another specific feature of the 
Slovenian system.
163
 This additionally strengthens the role played by the National 
Assembly in the appointment of ministers. It is clear that this procedure of appointing 
ministers as determined by the Constitution is inconsistent with the nature of the 
parliamentary system and the principle of separation of powers stipulated by the 
Constitution.  
 
Compared to other systems and considering the theoretical premises, the Slovenian 
procedure for forming the government is specific, and it is accordingly hard to classify 
Slovenia as a country with the parliamentary system. The President has the right to 
nominate a candidate for the Prime Minister to be elected by the parliament under two 
other constitutions – Hungary’s and Bulgaria’s. However, only the position of the 
Slovenian President is further weakened by the fact that others may also nominate their 
candidates. In the majority of examined systems the President is involved in the 
appointment of ministers. Slovenia and Bulgaria are the only exceptions, and Slovenia 
is also the only country where the ministers are appointed by the legislative body. It 
would be reasonable to resolve this issue by following the example of the German 
Constitution or e.g. Czech Constitution, under which the President appoints the Prime 
Minister and, at the Prime Minister’s proposal, ministers, after which the government 




4.2 President’s Powers in Election and Appointing Officials 
 
4.2.1 Appointing and Nominating State Officials 
 
The President is responsible for appointing (the highest) state officials in the majority of 
new EU democracies, with the parliament playing a stronger role in Latvia and 
Slovenia. Constitutions grant this power to Presidents due to their (neutral) position in 
the government system. This is aimed at providing a balance in relation to other state 
bodies, especially the legislative body, and accordingly weakening political influence 
over certain public offices. Last but not least, a presidential appointment also leads to a 
better reputation in a society. Systems in the examined countries can be divided into 
those where the appointments of officials are regulated by the constitution and those 
where these appointments are regulated by relevant laws in accordance with the 
constitutional mandate. The President’s role i.e. powers in appointing state officials in a 
system depend primarily on whether the President is completely independent in making 
these decisions, or whether they must cooperate with other bodies. 
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In the majority of the examined countries, the President is involved in appointing the 
management of the central bank. Only in Latvia, Romania, and Bulgaria is this under 
the exclusive power of the parliament. In almost one half of the examined countries (the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia), the President is also involved in the 
appointment of the president of the Court of Auditors. In certain countries, the President 
is also responsible for appointing the director of the intelligence agency. 
 
Under the Czech Constitution, the President appoints the president and vice-president of 
the Court of Auditors at the proposal of the Chamber of Deputies, which does not 
require a countersignature by the Prime Minister or a relevant minister.
 165
 The President 
also dismisses these two officials at the proposal of the Chamber of Deputies, which is a 
power granted to them not by the Constitution, but by the relevant law.
166
 The President 
also appoints and dismisses the central bank governor and vice-governor, and other 
members of the central bank’s management, which does not require a countersignature 
either.
167
 Under the Polish Constitution, the President nominates a candidate for the 
office of the president of the National Bank of Poland to Sejm. The President also 
independently appoints one third of the members of the Council for Monetary Policy, 
which is a body of the central bank.
168
 The Polish President also appoints and dismisses 
members of the National Security Council, which is the President’s advisory body for 
external and internal security.
169
 Estonian President also nominates candidates for the 
offices of Auditor General, Chairman of the Board of the Bank of Estonia, and 
Chancellor of Justice, who are appointed by the parliament. The governor of the central 
bank is appointed and dismissed by the President at the proposal of the board of the 
Bank of Estonia. 
170
 If an appointment breaches the law or contravenes national interest, 
the President may refuse to appoint a certain state official.
171
 In 2000, for example, the 
President refused to appoint a candidate nominated by the Bank of Estonia’s board to 
the office of the governor of the bank.
172
 Under the Constitution, the Lithuanian 
President nominates candidates for the offices of Auditor General and the Chairperson 
of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania, who are appointed by the parliament. With the 
approval of the parliament, the Lithuanian President also appoints the director of the 
Security Service, and other state officials, when determined by the law.
173
 Under the 
provisions of the Hungarian Constitution and the Act on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, the 
President appoints the governor and vice-governor of the central bank (at the proposal 




The Slovak Constitution does not expressly regulate the appointment of individual state 
officials by the head of state; instead it includes a provision granting the President the 
power to appoint the highest state officials where this is determined by the relevant 
law.
175
 Under the law, the Slovak President appoints and dismisses the governor and 
vice-governor of the Slovak central bank at the proposal of the government and with the 
approval of the National Council.
176
 At the proposal of the government, the Slovak 
President also appoints and dismisses the president of the national statistics office, and 
the director of the intelligence agency.
177
 Romanian and Bulgarian constitutions also 
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have provisions that only determine that the President appoints state officials in cases 
stipulated by relevant laws.
178
 The only provision expressly regulating appointments in 
the Romanian Constitution gives the President the power to nominate the candidate for 
the director of the intelligence agency, who is then appointed by the parliament.
179
 
According to the relevant legislation, the Bulgarian President is responsible for 
numerous appointments. The President appoints, inter alia, three members of the 
management board of the Bulgarian central bank, the director of the intelligence agency, 




In addition to the aforementioned powers, the section of this paper on appointments also 
examines the President’s powers in forming the judicial branch of government. These 
appointments are not part of the President’s executive powers, however they concern 
state officials, and these powers significantly affect the President’s position. A 
comparison will allow us to critically assess the appropriateness of the Slovenian 
system in regard to these powers.
181
 In almost all new EU democracies (except 
Bulgaria, Latvia, and Slovenia), the President holds the power to appoint judges, usually 
in collaboration with a relevant body or a so called judicial council. The system is 
somewhat different in Estonia, where the President appoints judges at the proposal of 
the Supreme Court.
182
 In Bulgaria, one of the three countries where the President does 
not appoint judges, judges are appointed by the Judicial Council.
183
 The Latvian 
President is in a similar position in relation to the formation of the judicial branch of 
government. The Constitutional Court and other judges in Latvia are appointed by the 
parliament without any involvement of the President.
184
 Lithuanian system also 
deserves a closer look. The Lithuanian Constitution determines different procedures for 
the appointment of judges based on the type of the judge. Supreme Court judges are 
appointed by the parliament at the proposal of the President. Other judges and 
presidents of courts are appointed by the President after consultation with the judicial 
council. The parliament’s approval is required for the appointment of judges to the 
Court of Appeal.
185
 In the majority of examined countries, the President only formally 
approves the candidates nominated for judges, however this is not a formal duty of the 
President that cannot be refused, but is the President’s right.
186
 Presidential appointment 
of judges at the proposal of another body is the most common way in which the head of 




In comparison with the appointment of regular judges, legislative bodies play a stronger 
role in the appointment of Constitutional Court judges. In almost one half of the 
examined countries (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria), 
Constitutional Court judges are appointed by the President. In Romania and Bulgaria, 
the Presidents share this power with other entities, and as a result they only appoint one 
third of all Constitutional Court judges. The Czech President is also restricted when it 
comes to forming the Constitutional Court, since the cooperation i.e. approval of Senate 
is required for the appointment of Constitutional Court judges. Under the Czech 
Constitution, the lower house of the parliament cannot influence the composition of the 
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Constitutional Court. The Slovak President is not completely independent in appointing 
Constitutional Court judges either, and must select them from the candidates proposed 
by the parliament. The Slovak parliament must submit a list with twice as many 
candidates as there are Constitutional Court judges under the Constitution. They system 
is different in Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia, where the 
Constitutional Court judges are appointed or elected by the parliament. In Lithuania and 
Slovenia, candidates are nominated by the President.
188
 In Estonia, where the Supreme 
Court is the highest court in the country and is thus responsible for constitutional 
reviews, Supreme Court judges are appointed by the Parliament at the proposal of the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The President only has the power to propose a 
candidate for the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to the parliament. In Poland, the 
appointment of constitutional court (Constitutional Tribunal) judges is in the hands of 
the lower house of the parliament, while the President appoints the president of the 
Constitutional Tribunal and their deputy at the proposal of the General Assembly of the 
Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal.  
 
4.2.2 Proposed Powers of the President of the Republic of Slovenia 
 
Under Article 107 of the Constitution, the President has the power to appoint state 
officials where this is determined by the relevant laws. The President’s power to 
(directly) appoint state officials has so far not been stipulated by any law; however 
certain laws have granted new powers to the President, even though the Constitution 
does not expressly regulate that. The President now has the power to submit to the 
National Assembly nominations of candidates for appointment to certain public offices. 
The Human Rights Ombudsman Act gives the President the power to submit to the 
National Assembly nominations for candidates for human rights Ombudsman.
189
 Under 
the Court of Audit Act, the President selects candidates for the offices of the president 
of the Court of Audit, and their first and second deputy from the received applications, 
and submits to the National Assembly a nomination for their appointment.
190
 Under the 
Bank of Slovenia Act, the President is responsible for nominating candidates for the 
offices of the governor and vice-governor of the Bank of Slovenia, as well as members 
of the Governing Board of the Bank of Slovenia, who are then appointed by the 
National Assembly.
191
 Under the Act on Nomination of Candidates from the Republic 
of Slovenia for Judges at International Court, the President has the power to propose 
candidates for international courts to the National Assembly.
192
 The Information 
Commissioner Act determines that the President must propose to the National Assembly 
a candidate for appointment to the office of the information commissioner.
193
 The 
Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act meanwhile prescribes the procedure, in 
which the President is involved in the final phase of appointing the Commission for the 
Prevention of the Corruption. The President appoints the Chief Commissioner and their 
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The question arises whether the legislators have overstepped the boundaries of the 
President’s constitutional powers by granting them the power to nominate candidates, 
since the Constitution only determines expressly that the appointment of state officials 
by the President should be regulated by relevant laws, but does not stipulate the same 
for nominating candidates. If we apply the argument a maiori ad minus, the President 
should also have the right to nominate candidates and not only appoint state officials.
195
 
The view that legislators overstepped the boundaries of the President’s constitutional 
powers in these cases seems more appropriate.
196
 Despite the open question of whether 
the aforementioned provisions are in compliance with the Constitution, we can conclude 
that the President’s right to nominate candidates in the procedure of electing or 
appointing officials is extremely important, perhaps even decisive, since the National 
Assembly may only appoint or elect candidates nominated by the President to these 
offices.
197
 We have found that the Slovenian system is significantly different from the 
comparable systems when it comes to the number of cases in which the President 
nominates candidates for state offices.  
 
Another big difference lies in the way the judicial branch is formed, and the President’s 
involvement in the procedure, as the Slovenian President does not have the power to 
appoint judges, who are appointed by the National Assembly at the proposal of the 
Judicial Council instead.
 
The President is however involved in the formation of the 
Judicial Council, five members of which are elected by the National Assembly at the 
proposal of the President, who nominates candidates from among university professors 
of law, attorneys, and other lawyers (Article 131 of the Constitution). The procedure for 
appointing or electing judges as applied in our system may be questionable, especially if 
we consider the requirement for the independence of judges. By the nature of things, 
decisions of the National Assembly are political, which also holds true for elections and 
appointments in general, and the election of judges accordingly.
198
 We would 
recommend amending the Slovenian Constitution, and giving the President the power to 
appoint judges at the proposal of an appropriately composed Judicial Council.
199
 
Slovenia would thus introduce the procedure for appointing judges, which is widely 
used in similar systems and which is compliant with the principle of the separation of 
powers, and the characteristics of the parliamentary system. 
 
When it comes to the formation of the Constitutional Court, the Slovenian system, in 
which the Constitutional Court judges are elected by the National Assembly at the 
proposal of the President, does not prima facie seem to be different from the systems in 
place in the examined countries. Such a system (especially considering the majority 
required for an appointment) doubtlessly allows political parties to influence the 
election of judges and consequently the work of the Constitutional Court.
200
 This can 
become a problem, since the Constitutional Court can affect the functioning of the state 
and the politics due to its powers.
201
 One of the possible safeguards is requesting a 
stronger majority for the election of Constitutional Court judges. 
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With the countersignature, the government assumes responsibility for the President’s 
decisions, however the countersignature by the Prime Minister or a relevant minister 
does not only represent the acceptance of political responsibility, but is also a 
precondition for the validity of the legal documents signed by the President.
202
 The 
institute of countersignature should ensure unity in running the country, it however 
limits the already weak powers granted to the President in a parliamentary system by 
adding the obligation of countersignature, which detracts from any independence the 




Among new EU democracies, the Slovenian and Estonian constitutions are the only two 
that do not stipulate that the President’s documents should be countersigned.
204
 In 
Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Lithuania, the Constitution 
specifies the cases when the President needs a countersignature of the Prime Minister.
205 
The countersignature is most frequently required for the appointments and dismissals of 
diplomatic representatives, for pardonings, for concluding international treaties, and for 
conferring recognitions, titles and highest military ranks. In the Czech Republic, the 
countersignature is also required for the appointment of judges. Contrary to the above 
listed constitutions, the Bulgarian and Polish Constitutions specify the cases in which 
the countersignature is not required.
206
 The countersignature is not required inter alia 
when the President promulgates an adopted law, or when they send an adopted law back 
to the parliament for reconsideration, when they dissolve the parliament or call a general 
election. Under the Polish Constitution, the countersignature is also not needed for 
President’s legislative initiatives, and for the appointment of judges. Under Latvian 
Constitution, the countersignature is required for any documents except for the 




The Slovenian system, which does not require a countersignature from the Prime 
Minister and relevant ministers on the President’s documents, is therefore an exception, 
although there are no fundamental arguments against introducing this institute in the 
Slovenian Constitution despite smaller existing powers of the President (in comparison 
to other countries).
208
 On the other hand, the question of whether it would make sense to 
introduce countersignature into our Constitution arises, especially if we consider the fact 
that the National Assembly is in a much stronger position in its relation to the 
government, as well as the President.
209
 Accordingly, the introduction of the 
countersignature into the Slovenian system, especially in the President’s powers to 
nominate candidates, would be an even greater departure from the principle of the 
separation of powers, and the parliamentary system. 
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The parliamentary system is in place in all the examined new EU democracies, with the 
executive powers divided between the head of the state and the government led by the 
Prime Minister. Although the President’s powers in such a system primarily tend to 
reside in representation and launching initiatives, the study has revealed that the 
position of the President i.e. the extent of his executive and legislative powers in 
modern systems varies. 
 
1. Some facts about the position of the head of state, and the associated classification of 
political systems should be summarized. There are various criteria used for assessing 
the role or position of the President. Of course certain powers are not just a dead letter, 
and the actual application and use of individual powers should be considered. Especially 
in new democracies a more restrictive approach is required (considering the relatively 
short period), since the practice has not been fully established yet. We can conclude that 
Slovenia has a parliamentary system with individual elements of the assembly system in 
place. Hungary, Estonia, and Latvia have a typical parliamentary system with an 
indirectly elected President. Slovakia and the Czech Republic are partial exceptions 
(due to the election system). The President has a stronger position in Poland and 
Lithuania, which corresponds to the direct election, which gives the President greater 
legitimacy. These two systems have some elements of the parliamentary presidential 
system. Bulgaria could tentatively be examined in this group due to the past political 
and personal ambitions pursued by the office of the President, however not based on 
actual constitutional powers. This also applies to Romania, where the powers of the 
President were clearly demarcated by amending the Constitution. Systems with a 
powerful President have proven to be effective and appropriate in the transitional 
period, when a stable political system was necessary, which the parliamentary system 
with a large number of political parties rarely provides. After stabilization in the 
political arena, the majority of examined countries proceeded to gradually curb the 
President’s powers. Even in systems where the President is granted broader powers and 
thus given stronger influence on the work of legislative and executive bodies, the 
President exercises these powers less frequently, which also affects the potential 
duration of cohabitation. 
 
2. In the powers examined in the legal area we can conclude by saying that they are the 
broadest and therefore the most important set of presidential powers. Although 
individual Presidents (Hungarian, Polish, Lithuanian, and Latvian) have a legislative 
initiative at their disposal, in practice it is but rarely exercised. Thus the most important 
power that the President can use to affect the wording of an act is the right to suspensive 
veto. Namely the President in all the examined systems promulgates laws, and in doing 
so also has (except in Slovenia) the right to legislative veto, which parliament can 
“circumvent”. Here the weight of the President’s veto depends on the number of 
deputies who must support the law in order for it to be adopted. The effect the President 
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has on the wording of a law is also dependent on whether or not it is permitted for a 
vetoed law to be amended before a new round of voting or not. In all the systems it is 
the case that if parliament once again approves the law, the President no longer has the 
right to legislative veto. In Romania, Estonia, Poland, and Hungary the President also 
has the power of constitutional veto. The President in the systems examined in general 
must decide whether or not to use the constitutional or legislative veto. Estonia and 
Hungary are exceptions here, as it is possible to use both vetoes for the same law. In 
systems where the President does not hold the right of constitutional veto as a type of ex 
ante review of constitutionality they have the right to request a constitutional review of 
the law after its promulgation and its coming into force. The Slovenian system is yet 
again an exception, as it does not recognize the President’s right in the legislative 
process to a legislative or constitutional veto, nor to even request a review of 
constitutionality. Accordingly it would certainly serve well to strengthen the role of the 
President in terms of legislative powers.  
 
3. In the majority of the countries examined the President has the power to call elections 
and call the constitutive sitting of parliament. The President can also generally call or 
request that regular or special sittings of parliament be called. The more important 
presidential power, on the basis of which a relationship is established between the 
President, parliament, and the government, is definitely the power to dissolve 
parliament. This type of presidential power is most often conditional with parliament’s 
inability to form a government, or due to the government losing support in parliament. 
In the event that a government is not formed, the President must dissolve parliament 
only in Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, and Slovenia. In the majority of countries the 
President may solely decide whether or not to dissolve parliament or not in a given 
scenario. Parliament may be dissolved when the government loses parliamentary 
support during the President’s term, as these bodies are inextricably linked. Even in this 
case the final decision on dissolving parliament rests with the President. This holds true 
for the Slovak, Czech, Estonian, and Lithuanian systems. The Slovenian system is 
unique in this regard, as its Constitution obligates the President to dissolve the National 
Assembly if it fails to issue a vote of confidence. Due to past experience with 
dissolution, it would serve to emulate the Latvian system in terms of dissolving 
parliament, as in Latvia the right to dissolve parliament is not conditional upon 
parliament’s inability to form a government, or due to a parliamentary majority vote of 
no confidence in the government. The President can propose the dissolution of 
parliament at any time, whereupon a referendum follows. The President’s decision is 
adopted if it is voted for by a majority of those who cast votes, after which 
parliamentary elections follow.
 
In the event that a majority of the voters in a referendum 
are against dissolving parliament, the President’s office is terminated.  
 
4. When examining the President’s executive powers we have found that the President’s 
powers in the formation of the government were among the most significant. In the 
majority of the examined countries the President appoints the Prime Minister, who must 
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then win a vote of confidence in the parliament. When selecting the Prime Minister, the 
President must consider the election results, since the work of the government depends 
on the trust of the parliament. The role that the legislative body plays in the formation of 
the government is stronger in countries, where the parliament has the right to nominate 
a candidate for Prime Minister if the President’s candidate fails. This applies to the 
Polish, Czech, and Estonian systems. In only three of the examined countries, the 
legislative body plays the decisive role: in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovenia, where the 
Prime Minister is elected by the parliament at the proposal of the President. The 
position of the Slovenian President is further weakened by the fact that, unlike in 
Hungary and Bulgaria, other proponents may also nominate their candidates. Ministers 
are usually appointed by the President at the proposal of the Prime Minister. This is 
only a formal approval i.e. appointment of the proposed members of the government. 
The Slovenian system has the most specific procedure for appointing ministers, which 
makes it rather hard to classify it among parliamentary systems.  
 
5. In the majority of systems the President appoints (the highest) state officials. Most 
frequently, the President is involved in appointing the governor and vice-governor of 
the central bank, or members of the central bank’s management board, and in 
appointing the president of the court of auditors. In two of the examined countries, 
Latvia and Slovenia, the position of the President in appointing officials is weakened, as 
the majority of state officials (including judges) are appointed by the parliament. 
Nevertheless, the Slovenian President plays a very important role in the process of 
electing and appointing state officials by nominating candidates for some of the highest 
state offices, which are the guardians of constitutional principles in their essence, as the 
National Assembly may only elect these state officials from among the candidates 
nominated by the President. Considering the powers held by the Slovenian President, 
we can conclude that the President’s power to nominate candidates for state officials is 
of key importance. 
 
6. The institution of countersignature, which is obligatory for certain of the President’s 
decisions, should also be highlighted when it comes to the executive powers. By 
countersigning, the Prime Minister or relevant ministers assume political responsibility 
for the President’s decision, and give validity to the President’s legal acts. The 
Slovenian system, which does not require a countersignature, is an exception, although 
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Public Law, 2004, p. 27.  
61 Cf. also I. Kaučič: Predsednik republike med ustavo in politično prakso, in: Podjetje in delo, 32 
(2006) 6/7, p. 1627. 
62 Idem S. Nerad: Razmerje predsednika republike do sodne oblasti, in: 10th Days of Public Law, 
2004, p. 71. 
63 For more on the President’s right to substantive review of a law’s constitutionality, see E. 
Kerševan: Vloga predsednika republike v zakonodajnem postopku z vidika varstva vladavine 
prava, in: Pravnik, 64 (2009) 11/12, p. 656 and 659.  
64 This type of condition for acting in lieu of the President is not included in the Slovenian 
Constitution. Cf. S. Zagorc: Nezdružljivost funkcije in nadomeščanje predsednika republike, in: 
10th Days of Public Law, 2004, p. 95-112 and I. Kaučič: Predsednik republike, in: L. Šturm (ed.): 
Komentar Ustave Republike Slovenije, Dopolnitev - A, Faculty of Postgraduate Government and 
European Studies, Ljubljana 2011, p. 1227-1230. 
65 More on referenda cf. I. Kaučič: Referendum in druge oblike neposredne demokracije, in: I. 
Kaučič (ed.): Zakonodajni referendum, Inštitut za primerjalno pravo in GV Založba, Ljubljana 
2010, p. 21-40. 
66 Article 95 of the Slovak Constitution, Article 98 of the Bulgarian Constitution, Article 90 of the 
Romanian Constitution, Article 125 of the Polish Constitution, Article 8 of the Hungarian 
Constitution. 
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67 Articles 17 and 63 of the Czech Constitution, Article 64 and 98 of the Bulgarian Constitution, 
Article 98 of the Polish Constitution, Articles 60 and 78 of the Estonian Constitution, and Articles 
57 and 84 of the Lithuanian Constitution. 
68 Article 7 of the Romanian Law for Election of the Members of the Chamber of Deputies and of 
the Senate (Official Gazette of Romania, 887/2004, with subsequent amendments and 
supplements, Article 25 of the parliamentary Election Law of the Slovak Republic (no. 333/2004, 
of 13 May 2004, with subsequent amendments and supplements, Article 17 of the parliamentary 
Election Law of Latvia (of 25 May 1995, with subsequent amendments and supplements). 
69 Cf. M. Ribarič: Predsednik republike v procesu političnega odločanja, II. strokovno srečanje 
pravnikov s področja javnega prava, 1996, p. 84.  
70 In Article 12 the Latvian Constitution determines that a newly elected parliament is to be 
convened at the constitutive sitting on the first Tuesday in November. 
71 Article 34 of the Czech Constitution, Article 3 of the Hungarian Constitution, Article 82 of the 
Slovak Constitution, Article 75 of the Bulgarian Constitution, Article 63 of the Romanian 
Constitution, Article 109 of the Polish Constitution, Article 65 of the Lithuanian Constitution, 
Article 66 of the Estonian Constitution. 
72 Article 78 of the Bulgarian Constitution, Article 68 of the Estonian Constitution, Article 84 of 
the Lithuanian Constitution, Article 20 of the Latvian Constitution. 
73 Article 34 of the Czech Constitution, Article 66 of the Romanian Constitution. 
74 Article 82 of the Slovak Constitution. 
75 Articles 12-16 of the National Assembly Elections Act /ZVDZ/, (Uradni list RS 109/2006-
UPB1, 54/2007 Odl.US: U-I-7/07-22, Up-1054/07-24, 49/2008 Skl.US: U-I-272/07-12) and 
Articles 81 and 85 of the Slovenian Constitution. 
76 In calling elections, the President primarily determines the date of their announcement and their 
execution. More on presidential legal acts S. Zagorc: Pravni akti predsednika republike, Zbornik 
znanstvenih razprav, 65 (2005), Faculty of Law, University of Ljubljana, p. 323-344. 
77 In terms of eastern European countries the Russian President has the greatest powers in the 
event it is impossible to form a government. When the State Duma rejects the presidential 
candidate for Prime Minister, the President of the Russian Federation names the Minister 
themselves, simultaneously dissolving the Duma and calling early elections. More F. Grad, I. 
Kristan, A. Perenič: Primerjalno ustavno pravo, Faculty of Law, University of Ljubljana, 2006 p. 
337; and F. Grad: Položaj šefa države v ustavni ureditvi ruske federacije, in: Zbornik znanstvenih 
razprav, 58 (1998), Faculty of Law, University of Ljubljana, p. 57-70. 
78 Cf. E. Tanchev, M. Belov: The Republic of Bulgaria, in: C. Kortmann, J. Fleuren, W. 
Voermans (ed.): Constitutional Law of 2 EU Member States: Bulgaria and Romania: The 2007 
Enlargement, Kluwer Law International, 2008, p. I/75. 
79 Where a so-called “partial” dissolution of parliament is also possible. In this scenario, the 
President has the power to call a sitting of the dissolved parliament and determine its schedule of 
affairs. Latvia and Slovenia are the only systems considered where the Constitution allows a 
dissolved parliament to still convene, as in Latvia sittings are called and led by the dissolver, and 
in Slovenia a disbanded parliament can meet at its own initiative. Cf. Article 49 of the Latvian 
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Constitution and Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia decision no. U-I-23/12-14 of 5 
April 2012, Uradni list RS, no. 30/2012. 
80 Articles 33 and 35 of the Czech Constitution. The Czech Chamber of Deputies has never been 
dissolved. 
81 Article 35 of the Czech Constitution. 
82 Article 102 of the Slovak Constitution, Article 99 of the Bulgarian Constitution. 
83 Article 58 of the Lithuanian Constitution. 
84 Article 3 of the Hungarian Constitution. 
85 Article 98 of the Polish Constitution. 
86 Article 89 of the Romanian Constitution. 
87 Article 99 of the Bulgarian Constitution, Articles 98 and 155 of the Polish Constitution, Article 
89 of the Lithuanian Estonian Constitution. 
88 Article 3 of the Hungarian Constitution. 
89 Article 89 of the Romanian Constitution. 
90 Article 35 of the Czech Constitution. 
91 Article 102 of the Slovak Constitution. 
92 Article 58 of the Lithuanian Constitution. 
93 Cf. J. Tauber: Das politische System Litauens, in: W. Ismayr (ed.): Die politischen Systeme 
Osteuropas, 3rd edition, Vs Verlag, Wiesbaden 2010, p. 177. 
94 Article 87 of the Lithuanian Constitution. 
95 On the relationship between the representative body and the government cf. F. Grad: Parlament 
in vlada, Uradni list RS, Ljubljana 2000, p. 76. 
96 Article 97 of the Estonian Constitution, Article 58 of the Lithuanian Constitution. 
97 Articles 35 and 44 of the Czech Constitution, Article 102 of the Slovak Constitution. 
98 Article 225 of the Polish Constitution. 
99 Article 3 of the Hungarian Constitution.  
100 Article 119 of the Estonian Constitution.  
101 Article 35 of the Czech Constitution. 
102 Cf. V. Pavlicek, M. Kindlova: The Czech Republic, in: C. Kortmann, J. Fleuren, W. Voermans 
(ed.): Constitutional Law of 10 EU Member States: The 2004 Enlargement, Kluwer Law 
International, 2006, p. I/75. 
103 Article 102 of the Slovak Constitution. 
104 Articles 48-50 of the Latvian Constitution. 
105 In accordance with the constitutional amendment adopted in 2009, one-tenth of voters may 
demand that a referendum be called on dissolving parliament. A referendum on dissolution is 
impossible in the last 6 months of the President’s term (Article 14 of the Latvian Constitution). 
106 A similar system, in which parliament can be dissolved on the basis of a referendum and the 
initiative of the President, is known among member states of the European Council only in 
Kyrgyzstan. Cf. Venice Commission: Note on the Issue of Dissolution of Parliament, Study No. 
426 / 2007, Strasbourg, 8 November 2007, p. 3, available at www.venice.coe.int/docs/2007/CDL-
AD%282007%29037add4-e.pdf, of 28 October 2012. 
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107 Cf. K. Pētersone: Latvian President Initiates Dissolution of the parliament, in: Latvian Institute 
Factsheet (2011) 4, p. 3-5, available at www.latvia.lv/sites/default/files/2011_05_31__no_4_ 
latvian_resident_initiates_dissolution_of_the_parliament.pdf. Cf. also the OSCE/ODIHR report: 
The Republic of Latvia Early Parliamentary Elections 17 September 2011, Warsaw December 
2011, p. 3, available at www.osce.org/odihr/elections/86363, 28 October 2012. 
108 Cf. results of the Central Election Commission of Latvia: Elections & Referenda: Referenda: 
Referendum on dissolution of the 10th Saeima, available at 
http://web.cvk.lv/pub/public/29980.html, 28 October 2012. 
109 Article 105 of the Estonian Constitution. 
110 Articles 102 and 160 of the Slovak Constitution. 
111 Cf. F. Grad: Nekatere značilnosti razmerij med državnim zborom, državnim svetom, 
predsednikom republike in vlado, in: Javna uprava, 31 (1995) 4, p. 468. 
112 Articles 111 and 117 of the Slovenian Constitution.  
113 Cf. I. Kaučič: Vloga predsednika republike v parlamentarnem sistemu, in: Podjetje in delo, 37 
(2011) 6/7, p. 1063-1064. 
114 Cf. I. Kaučič: Predsednik republike med reprezentativno in izvršilno funkcijo, in: 10th Days of 
Public Law, 2004, p. 29. 
115 Cf. F. Grad: Ustavna ureditev organizacije državne oblasti, in: I. Kaučič (ed.): Dvajset let 
Ustave Republike Slovenije: pomen ustavnosti in ustavna demokracija, The Faculty of Law and 
the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana 2012, p. 59. For more on the 
limited role of the President in resolving conflicts between the government and the National 
Assembly due to the institution of constructive no confidence c.f. J Pogorelec: Položaj 
predsednika republike, in Pravna praksa, 24 (2005) 43, p. 3. 
116 Cf. M. Ribarič: Institucija predsednika republike ob 10-letnici ustave, in: 7th Days of Public 
Law, 2001, p. 105-119.  
117 In the German system the President may decide after 3 rounds of voting for Chancellor 
whether or not to dissolve the Bundestag or appoint a Chancellor who has received a relative 
majority of votes, and thus support the formation of a minority government. More in I. Kaučič: 
Položaj predsednika republike v izvršilni oblasti, in: VI. dnevi slovenske uprave, 1999, p. 53-61. 
In the countries examined the constructive vote of no confidence also exists in Hungary and 
Poland, where it was introduced by the new Constitution (1997), due to poor experience with 
previous (unstable) governments. 
118 Article 64 of the Czech Constitution. 
119 Article 87 of the Romanian Constitution.   
120 Article 46 of the Latvian Constitution.  
121 Cf. D. Iljanova: The Republic of Latvia, pp. V/38 and V/46. 
122 Cf. R. Kipke: Das politische System der Slowakei, p. 321.  
123 Article 97 of the Lithuanian Constitution. 
124 Article 96 of the Lithuanian Constitution. More about the executive powers of the Lithuanian 
President in A. Hollstein: Das staatsorganisatorische Modell der neuen litauischen Verfassung: 
Ein dritter Weg zwischen präsidialem und parlamentarischem System?, pp. 109–113. 
125 Article 141 of the Polish Constitution. 
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126 About different systems of government formation see I. Kaučič: Predsednik republike med 
reprezentativno in izvršilno funkcijo, p. 30. 
127 About the formation of government in Romania see Articles 85, 103, and 107 of the 
Constitution. 
128 In Lithuania, the government must seek a new vote of confidence from the parliament if more 
than one half of the ministers are replaced (Article 101 of the Lithuanian Constitution). 
129 These amendments to the Romanian Constitution represented a shift from the semi-
presidential to the parliamentary system. Cf. C. Ionescu: Romania, p. II/70. Cf. Articles 85 and 
106 of the Romanian Constitution of 1991, and Articles 46 and 52 of the Law for the Revision of 
the Constitution of Romania, no. 429/2003 (Official Gazette of Romania no. 758/2003). 
130 About the role of the Lithuanian President in L. Talat-Kelpša: The presidency and democratic 
consolidation in Lithuania, pp. 156–169. 
131 Article 92 of the Lithuanian Constitution. 
132 For the semi-presidential system in the period of so called Small Constitution and the adoption 
of the new Constitution see E. Bos: Verfassungsgebung und Systemwechsel: Die 
Institutionalisierung von Demokratie im postsozialistischen Osteuropa. 
133 Cf. K. Ziemer and C. Y. Matthes: Das politische System Polens, pp. 212–225 and C. Y. 
Matthes: Polen und Ungarn - Parlamente im Systemwechsel: Zur Bedeutung einer politischen 
Institution für die Konsolidierung neuer Demokratien. 
134 Cf. J. Juchler: Politische Polarisierung in Polen: Zur Entwicklung seit den 
Präsidentschaftswahlen, pp. 315–326. 
135 For the formation of government in Poland see Articles 154 and 155 of the Constitution, and 
also B. Banaszak: The Republic of Poland, p. VIII/33. 
136 If Sejm passes a vote of no confidence, it must elect a new Prime Minister, who is then 
appointed by the President, since the Polish system recognizes the institute of the constructive 
vote of no confidence. The constructive vote of no confidence was introduced by the new 
Constitution (1997) due to negative experience with previous (unstable) governments. 
137 Articles 158–162 of the Polish Constitution, cf. also B. Banaszak: The Republic of Poland, p. 
VIII/21. 
138 The Estonian government must resign when the first session of the newly elected parliament is 
convened, if the Prime Minister resigns or dies, or if the parliament passes a vote of no confidence 
against the government or Prime Minister (Article 92 of the Estonian Constitution). 
139 For the formation of government in Estonia see article 89 of the Constitution, cf. also M. 
Lagerspetz, K. Maier: Das politische System Estlands, p. 91.  
140 Article 68 of the Czech Constitution. 
141 For the formation of government in Slovakia see Articles 110–113 of the Slovakian 
Constitution) and A. Bröstl: The Slovak Republic, p. IX/22. For the formation of government in 
Latvia see Articles 55 and 56 of the Constitution and T. Schmidt: Das politische System 
Lettlands, pp. 139–140. 
142 The Latvian Constitution is the only one without express provisions on dismissal. 
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143 Articles 74 and 75 of the Czech Constitution. Under Article 73 of the Constitution, the 
government must resign if the parliament rejects a vote of confidence or passes a vote of no 
confidence. 
144 Articles 115 and 116 of the Slovak Constitution. 
145 Articles 90 and 92 of the Estonian Constitution, Articles 159 and 161 of the Polish 
Constitution, and Articles 92 and 101 of the Lithuanian Constitution. In six of the examined 
countries – Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, Poland, and Slovakia –parliament can pass a vote 
of no confidence against individual ministers. 
146 Articles 85 and 107 of the Romanian Constitution. 
147 Article 16 of the Hungarian Constitution. 
148 The formation of the government in Bulgaria is based on the Greek Constitution of 1975. 
149 For the formation of the government in Bulgaria see Articles 99 and 108 of the Bulgarian 
Constitution. 
150 Cf. also S. Riedel: Das politische System Bulgariens, p.681. 
151 Article 84 of the Bulgarian Constitution.  
152 Cf. E. Tanchev, M. Belov: The Republic of Bulgaria, pp. I/73–I/75.  
153 Article 111 of the Slovenian Constitution. Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly 
determine that, within 30 days of the National Assembly being constituted, the President must 
propose a candidate for the Prime Minister to the National Assembly (Article 225 of PoDZ-1, 
Official Gazette of the RS no. 92/2007-Official Consolidated Text 1, 105/2010, 79/2012 
Constitutional Court Decision). The question arises whether such a deadline can be determined by 
the Rules of Procedure, since the Constitution does not prescribe one. Cf. M. Ribarič: Predsednik 
republike v procesu političnega odločanja, p. 91. 
154 Cf. I. Kaučič: Pristojnosti predsednika republike pri oblikovanju vlade, pp. 1125–1135. More 
in I. Kaučič: Vloga predsednika republike v parlamentarnem sistemu, pp. 1057–1066. 
155 The fact that the candidate for the Prime Minister can be nominated by the President and other 
proponents at the same time is a specific feature of the Slovenian system. The system is different 
in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Estonia, where the parliament gets the exclusive right to 
appoint (or nominate a candidate for) the Prime Minister, if the President’s candidate fails to 
garner sufficient support. 
156 Bulgaria, Estonia, and Poland are the only other countries where the President must dissolve 
the parliament in the event that a government is not formed. In other countries the President may 
decide whether or not to dissolve the parliament in a given scenario. Among Eastern European 
countries, the Russian President has the broadest powers in the event that the formation of 
government fails. When the State Duma rejects the presidential candidate for Prime Minister three 
times is a row, the President of the Russian Federation names the Prime Minister, simultaneously 
dissolving the Duma and calling snap election. More in F. Grad, I. Kristan, A. Perenič: 
Primerjalno ustavno pravo, p. 337 and F. Grad: Položaj šefa države v ustavni ureditvi ruske 
federacije, pp. 57–70. 
157 The purpose of the framers of the Constitution to only give the President the option without 
imposing the obligation of nominating a candidate in the second and third round is clear. Cf. S. 
Zagorc: Institut protipodpisa aktov šefa države, p. 92. 
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158 In practice, the National Assembly elected a Prime Minister that was not nominated by the 
President only on one occasion.  
159 Cf. M. Ribarič: Odnos med predsednikom Republike Slovenije in vlado, p. 52.  
160 Cf. F. Grad: Nekatere značilnosti razmerij med državnim zborom, državnim svetom, 
predsednikom republike in vlado, pp. 457–476 and F. Grad: Državni zbor in oblikovanje vlade, 
pp. 1114–1124. 
161 Cf. M. Cerar: Položaj in vloga predsednika Republike Slovenije, p. 769. 
162 Cf. C. Ribičič: Predsednik republike kot element stabilnosti v parlamentarnem sistemu, p. 87. 
163 Cf. I. Kaučič: Položaj predsednika republike v izvršilni oblasti, p. 59. 
164 Cf. M. Ribarič: Institucija predsednika republike ob 10-letnici ustave, pp. 105–119. 
165 Article 97 of the Czech Constitution. 
166 Article 10 of the Act Concerning the Supreme Audit Office (no. 166 of 20 May 1993, with 
subsequent amendments and supplements). The Supreme Audit Office is an independent body 
that controls the management of the state assets, and national budget spending. 
167 Article 62 of the Czech Constitution and Article 6 of the Act on the Czech National Bank (no. 
6/1993, with subsequent amendments and supplements). 
168 Article 227 of the Polish Constitution. 
169 Articles 135 and 144 of the Polish Constitution. Under Article 214 of the Constitution, the 
President also appoints three members of the National Council of Radio Broadcasting and 
Television. 
170 Article 78 of the Estonian Constitution. The Chancellor of Justice is an independent official 
who reviews the legislative and executive branches for conformity with the Constitution and the 
laws (Article 139). 
171 Cf. K. Merusk: The Republic of Estonia, p. III/27. 
172 Cf. M. Brkljacic et al: Constitution Watch: A country-by-country update on constitutional 
politics in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR: Estonia, pp. 16–18. 
173 Articles 84, 126, and 133 of the Lithuanian Constitution.  
174 Article 41 of the Hungarian Constitution and Articles 47 and 48 the Act on the Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank (no. CCVIII, of 2011, with subsequent amendments and supplements). The 
Hungarian President also appoints university rectors and professors, and approves the 
appointment of the president of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Article 9 of the 
Constitution). The President also appoints the president of the Budget Council, a body that is 
involved in the adoption of the budget (Article 44 of the Constitution). 
175 Article 102 of the Slovak Constitution. The Slovak President also appoints university rectors 
and professors, and three members of the Judicial Council (Articles 102 and 141 of the 
Constitution). 
176 Article 7 of the Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic on the National Bank of 
Slovakia (No. 566/1992, of 18th November 1992, with subsequent amendments and 
supplements). 
177 Article 6 of the Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic on State Statistics (No. 
540/2001, with subsequent amendments and supplements), and Article 3 of the Act of the 
48 THE POWERS OF THE HEAD OF STATE IN THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
IN FORMER SOCIALIST SYSTEMS 
T. Dubrovnik, A. Kobal 
 
- 
National Council of the Slovak Republic on Slovak Information Service (of 21 January 1993, 
with subsequent amendments and supplements). 
178 Article 94 of the Romanian Constitution, Article 98 of the Bulgarian Constitution. 
179 Article 65 of the Romanian Constitution. 
180 Cf. E. Tanchev, M. Belov: The Republic of Bulgaria, p. I/69 and President of the Republic of 
Bulgaria: Institution: Constitutional provisions: Participating in the constituting of public bodies, 
available at www.president.bg, as on 27 May 2013. 
181 For a comparison of how the appointment of highest state officials is regulated in examined 
systems, see J. McGregor: The Presidency in East Central Europe, pp. 26–27. 
182 On the appointment of Constitutional Court judges see Articles 1 and 9 of the Hungarian 
Constitution; Articles 134 and 142 of the Romanian Constitution; Articles 63 and 84 of the Czech 
Constitution; Articles 134 and 145 of the Slovak Constitution; Article 147 of the Bulgarian 
Constitution; Articles 179 and 194 of the Polish Constitution and Article 5 of the Constitutional 
Tribunal Act of the Republic of Poland (Dz. U. no. 102/643, of 1 August 1997, with subsequent 
amendments and supplements); Article 150 of the Estonian Constitution; Articles 103 and 112 of 
the Lithuanian Constitution. 
183 Under Article 129 of the Bulgarian Constitution, the Chairman of the Supreme Court is 
appointed and dismissed by the President at the proposal of the Judicial Council. The President 
may not deny an appointment or dismissal if the Judicial Council repeats the proposal. When the 
Constitution was amended in 2004, deputies were granted the right to propose the dismissal of the 
Chairman of the Supreme Court to the President, which the Constitutional Court later declared as 
unconstitutional (as it violates the principle of the separation of powers and independent 
judiciary). Cf. Constitutional Court of the Republic of Bulgaria Decision, No. 7/2006 of 13 
September 2006. 
184 More about the formation of the judicial branch of government in Latvia in D. Iljanova: The 
Republic of Latvia, pp. V/47–V/56. 
185  In 2006, the Constitutional Court stressed that the President may appoint judges only after 
receiving an opinion from the judicial council. Cf. Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Lithuania Decision, No. 13/04-21/04-43/04, “On the constitutional system of the judiciary and its 
self-government, on appointment, promotion, transfer of judges and their dismissal from office” 
of 9 May 2006. 
186  Cf. I. Kaučič: Predsednik republike in sodstvo, pp. 1252–1253.  
187  More in S. Nerad: Razmerje predsednika republike do sodne oblasti, pp. 59–61. 
188 The Lithuanian President nominates only one third of the Constitutional Court judges. 
189 Article 2 of ZVarCP (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, no. 71/1993, revised 
15/1994, 56/2002-ZJU, 109/2012). 
190 Article 8 of ZRacS-1 (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, no. 11/2001, No. 20/2006-
ZNOJF-1, 109/2012). It should be examined whether such a procedure for appointing state 
auditors, as well as the procedure for appointing judges, except for Constitutional Court judges, is 
appropriate, cf. M. Ribarič: Predsednik republike v procesu političnega odločanja, p. 89.  
191 Articles 35, 36 and 37 of ZBS-1 (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 72/2006-UPB1, 
59/2011). 
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192 Article 6 of ZPKSMS (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 64/2001, 59/2002, 
82/2004 Constitutional Court Decision: U-I-120/04-14).  
193 Article 6 of ZInfP (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, no. 113/2005, 51/2007-
ZUstS-A, 14/2010 Constitutional Court Decision: U-I-303/08-9). 
194 Article 9 of ZIntPK (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, no. 69/2011-UPB2). 
195 Cf. S. Zagorc: Pravni akti predsednika republike, pp. 323–344. 
196 More in I. Kaučič: Predsednik republike med reprezentativno in izvršilno funkcijo, p. 25. 
197 Ibid., p. 33. 
198 Cf. M. Ribarič: Nekateri vidiki ustavnega položaja predsednika republike, pp. 119–134. 
199 Cf. M. Ribarič: Predsednik republike med ustavo in politico, p. 81. 
200 Constitutional Court judges are elected by the National Assembly with the majority of votes of 
all deputies (Article 14 of the Constitutional Court Act /ZUstS/ Official Gazette of the Republic 
of Slovenia, no. 64/2007-UPB1,108/2007 Constitutional Court Order: U-I-259/07-10, 109/2012). 
Considering the nature of the National Assembly, its decision is always political, and the 
President can only buffer individual political ambitions, but cannot completely avoid the ratio of 
political powers in the parliament. Cf. I. Kaučič: Sprememba ustavne ureditve volitev ustavnih 
sodnikov, p. 1507. 
201 Cf. F. Grad: Sistem organizacije državne oblasti, pp. 35–36. 
202 The Lithuanian Constitutional Court pointed out that even though the document is 
countersigned by a minister, the President is not relieved of the responsibility, if the document 
gravely violates the Constitution or the given oath. Cf. Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Lithuania Decision, no. 40/03, “On a decree of the President of the Republic” of 30 December 
2003. 
203 More in S. Zagorc: Institut protipodpisa aktov šefa države. P. 36. Cf. also M. Ribarič: 
Predsednik republike, p. 838. 
204 The Estonian Constitution only prescribes the institute of countersignature in the event that the 
Estonian parliament cannot meet, and the President issues a decree that has the force of law and is 
necessary to protect the interest of the state (Article 109 of the Constitution). 
205 Article 100 of the Romanian Constitution, Article 63 of the Czech Constitution, Article 9 of 
the Hungarian Constitution, Article 102 of the Slovak Constitution, Article 85 of the Lithuanian 
Constitution. 
206 Article 102 of the Bulgarian Constitution, Article 144 of the Polish Constitution. 
207 Article 53 of the Latvian Constitution. 
208 Cf. I. Kaučič: Predsednik republike, p. 1241 and M. Ribarič: Predsednik republike, p. 142. 
209 Cf. S. Zagorc: Institut protipodpisa aktov šefa države, p. 125. 
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